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In its 2006 Statement of Opportunities, NEMMCO projected that NSW would require 
327MW of additional electricity generating capacity to reliably meet projected demand by 
2010/11 (NEMMCO 2006). On 9 May 2007, as part of its response to this forecast deficit in 
future electricity generating capacity, the NSW Government invited Professor Anthony 
Owen to undertake an Inquiry into Electricity Supply in NSW. The NSW Government 
provided the Owen Inquiry with the following terms of reference: 
1. Review the need and timing for new baseload generation that maintains both 
security of supply and competitively priced electricity. 
2. Examine the baseload options available to efficiently meet any emerging generation 
needs. 
3. Review the timing and feasibility of technologies and/or measures available both 
nationally and internationally that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
4. Determine the conditions needed to ensure investment in any emerging generation, 
consistent with maintaining the NSW AAA Credit Rating. 
Professor Owen delivered his report on 11 September 2007 (Owen 2007) and the NSW 
Government is expected to announce its response soon. In brief, the report identifies a need 
for additional investment in baseload generation by 2013-14 and recommends privatisation 
of state-owned generation and retail businesses. 
The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) commissioned the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures (ISF) at the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) to consider the economic case 
for and against privatisation of electricity assets in NSW. This report reviews Australian and 
international experiences with electricity privatisation, critically examines the case for 
privatisation made by the Owen Report and proposes alternatives that have the potential to 
deliver a more sustainable future for the NSW electricity industry. 
Experiences of electricity industry privatisation 
While the circumstances of each privatisation project are unique, lessons can be learnt from 
privatisation experiences elsewhere. Victoria, South Australia and the United Kingdom have 
completely privatised their electricity industries. Evidence from these jurisdictions on the 
costs and benefits of privatisation is mixed and contested. While some claim that experiences 
of privatisation have been primarily positive and have delivered a great economic boost, 
others claim they have been disastrous for consumers, leading to price rises and reductions 
in reliability. Table ES1 summarises the claimed benefits and claimed costs or risks of 
electricity industry privatisation. Many of these claims are contradictory. The reality may lie 
somewhere between these two extremes.  
The privatisation of the Victorian electricity industry is widely regarded as one of the most 
successful privatisations because of the high price obtained for the assets. However, Quiggin 
(2002) demonstrates that the fiscal impact of the privatisation was neutral. That is, despite 
the high sale price, there was no net benefit to the public sector. 
It is fair to say that Australian and international experiences of electricity industry 
privatisation have not been universally positive. In fact, there is credible evidence for net 
negative impacts on the economy and on consumers. Given these previous experiences, 
there is no basis for simply assuming that privatisation will deliver economic benefits. 
Instead, it falls on the Owen Report (and subsequently the NSW Government) to build a 
credible, evidence-based case for why privatisation will deliver benefits in NSW.  
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Claimed Benefits Claimed Costs/Risks 
• Improvement to public 
finances 
• Transfer of commercial risk to 
private sector 
• Reduction in electricity prices 
• Labour productivity increases 
• Improvement in generator 
availability 
• Reduced number of 
disconnections 
• Refurbishment of old plant 
• Investment in more efficient 
power stations 
• Greater choice for consumers 
• Loss of revenue-generating assets 
• No improvement to public finances 
• Increase in electricity prices 
• Job losses and increased use of 
external contractors 
• Negative environmental outcome 
due to refurbishment of old polluting 
plant 
• Negative environmental outcome as 
no incentive to reduce consumption 
• High level of corporate debt and 
increased risk of company collapses 
and government bail outs 
• Negative impacts on vulnerable 
consumers 
• Greater potential for coercion of 
customers to switch retailers 
Table ES1: Claimed benef its and costs/risks of  electric ity industry  
privat isat ion from literature review. 
 
A critical review of the Owen Report 
The case for privatisation of the electricity generation and retail assets owned by the NSW 
Government is seriously overstated in the Owen Report. The key problems with the case 
presented in the Owen Report are as follows: 
• The electricity demand projections used by the Inquiry fail to adequately account for 
the impact of existing energy efficiency measures, particularly the measures 
introduced in recent years. Further, there is no consideration of the potential impact 
of stronger energy efficiency measures as an alternative to new baseload. 
• The electricity supply projections have already been overtaken by events with the 
announcement of the proposed Silverton Wind Farm and the new Federal Labor 
Government’s promise to increase the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target to 20% 
by 2020 
• As a result, it is very unlikely that new baseload power will be required as early as 
2013-14.  
• The Owen Report fails to give due consideration to the urgency of climate change 
response in its consideration of options for ensuring future energy security 
• The scale of investment required if the NSW Government retains its existing 
electricity assets is greatly overstated 
• The positive impact of privatisation on State finances is much less than is claimed and 
there appear to be inherent economic benefits associated with State ownership. Even 
the unlikely worst-case scenario of a downgrading of the State’s credit rating would 
have minimal economic impact. 
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• Privatisation is not necessary to encourage private sector investment in the electricity 
sector. Alternative options are available in which the State retains some or all of its 
existing electricity assets. 
• Many of the issues raised above are either ignored by the Owen Report or given 
inadequate attention. 
Alternative scenarios 
Decision-making processes like the Owen Inquiry need to be supported by high-quality 
independent analysis that deals appropriately with uncertainty. In the Owen Report, the 
choice of assumptions used to deal with uncertainty almost invariably strengthened the case 
for privatisation. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the desired outcome of the Inquiry 
had been determined in advance and the analysis was shaped to fit that outcome. 
A more appropriate way to deal with future uncertainty is to establish multiple scenarios 
that map out a plausible future territory and to examine differing assumptions that flow 
from these scenarios. In the case of the Owen Inquiry, this might have prompted a more 
adequate consideration of the impact of existing energy efficiency measures and possible 
future measures. It might also have drawn attention to the urgent need for climate change 
response.  
A detailed scenario-based approach would need more resources than were available for this 
research report. However, we have undertaken a basic scenario analysis to demonstrate the 
kind of results that emerge. We developed the following four alternative scenarios for the 
future of the NSW electricity industry: 
• Owen Inquiry Proposal: A scenario based directly on the analysis and 
recommendations of the Owen Inquiry.  
• Revised Owen: A scenario in which several of the key assumptions of the Owen 
Inquiry are revised based on the findings of the critical review in Section 3. We 
believe this scenario is much more plausible than the Owen Inquiry scenario. 
However, it does not go far enough to respond to climate change. 
• Strong Climate Change Response (private): A scenario in which there is a strong 
government and business response to climate change, with the private sector taking 
the lead after privatisation of electricity assets. This scenario achieves a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions but is likely to have negative impacts on consumers and on 
the State’s finances. 
• Strong Climate Change Response (public): A scenario in which there is a strong 
government and business response to climate change, with the NSW Government 
taking the lead after retaining electricity assets. This scenario achieves a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions and is likely to have a positive impact on consumers. 
The four scenarios are summarised in Table ES2.  
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(NPV = $6.2 
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(NPV = $3.4 
billion) 
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Net benefit of 
$77 million per 
year 
Net loss of $295 
million per year to 
net benefit of $387 
million per year 
Net loss of $295 
million per year 
to net benefit of 
$387 million per 
year 
Net loss of $295 
million per year 
to net benefit of 
$387 million per 
year 
Fate of assets Privatised Depends on sale 
price 





14% increase  8% increase 3% reduction 3% reduction 
Table ES2: Summary of scenarios. 
 
                                                      
1 NPV = net present value. This is the discounted present value of future cash flows used to compare 
the commercial merit of alternative scenarios. In this case, we have used a discount rate of 12%, which 
is typical for investment decisions. 
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Conclusion: A sustainability assessment 
Climate change response 
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the Owen Report is that it asks the wrong questions. In 
a time when urgent action is needed to avoid dangerous climate change, the Owen Report 
takes future electricity demand as given and asks how we can best continue to build fossil 
fuel power stations to supply that demand. This is old thinking, particularly now that 
Australia has committed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The right questions for the NSW 
Government to ask about the NSW electricity industry are: 
• What level of greenhouse gas reduction is required in the NSW electricity industry to 
contribute to avoiding dangerous climate change? 
• What are the most cost-effective technological and institutional measures for 
achieving this target in the NSW electricity industry, while maintaining a reliable 
supply? 
• How can these measures be rapidly deployed to achieve the target? 
The cost of climate change will dwarf any of the costs considered in the Owen Report and it 
is on this much bigger issue that the NSW Government should be focusing its attention. 
On the key question of climate change response, it is clear that the Owen Inquiry scenario 
and the Revised Owen scenario fail to deliver what is needed. Both would deliver substantial 
increases in emissions over the next ten years, at a time when we need to stabilise and reduce 
emissions. The two Strong Climate Change Response scenarios deliver a 3% reduction in 
emissions over the next ten years, which is consistent with the NSW Government’s target of 
stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at 2000 levels by 2025. 
The Strong Climate Change Response scenarios demonstrate that future demand can be met 
through a combination of new energy efficiency measures and new renewable energy, 
consistent with the requirements of an expanded MRET of 20% by 2020. This raises the 
prospect that NSW could leap to low-emission baseload power to meet future needs without 
building any additional high-emission power stations. A combination of renewable energy 
sources that are currently viable, particularly wind power and biomass, could provide a 
viable substitute for baseload now.  
In the longer term, technologies that could become viable over the coming years include 
geothermal hot rocks, large scale solar thermal power and carbon capture and storage. The 
existence of these prospective low-emission technologies provides a strong incentive to 
pursue additional energy efficiency measures to allow time for these technologies to become 
available. In addition, the NSW Government should provide specific support for each of 
these technologies to assist them to become available in time to meet any future baseload 
shortfall. If NSW is to meet its target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 60% by 2050, 
it needs to be developing and supporting low-emission baseload technologies now. 
Ownership and investment strategy 
Strong climate change response is possible under either public or private sector ownership 
but would have different characteristics. A recommended approach is as follows. 
The NSW Government should retain the State-owned generation and retail assets and invest 
as necessary to maintain the viability of these assets and reduce their environmental impact. 
This will definitely require some investment in the retail businesses to transform their 
business models, preferably to transform them into energy service companies focused on 
delivery of energy services with the lowest economic and environmental impact. The NSW 
Government should also invest strongly in energy efficiency and low-emission baseload 
technologies, and may also need to invest in carbon-reduction technologies at existing coal-
fired power stations in the future. 
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We do not accept the Owen Report’s assertion that this approach would lead to the public 
sector funding all future investment in the NSW electricity industry. The private sector has 
already shown its willingness to invest in the NSW electricity industry under the current 
arrangements, through the Tallawarra and Uranquinty gas-fired power stations and the 
proposed Silverton Wind Farm. Additional private sector certainty should be provided 
through a clear policy statement from the NSW Government on the conditions that would 
cause it to intervene to ensure supply security. The NSW Government could also choose to 
offer suitable sites for sale to interests that wish to develop low-emission baseload power, 
while retaining existing generation assets. 
The impact of this strategy on State finances would be far less serious than indicated by the 
Owen Report. Even with strong investment in energy efficiency and low-emission 
technologies, the scale of investment will be much less than the $12 to $15 billion indicated 
by the Owen Report. An investment in the order of $6-8 billion is more likely. Further, this 
investment will earn a rate of return, delivered through ongoing dividends to the NSW 
Government and profit accrued by the State-owned businesses. This revenue could, and 
should, be used to invest in the transformation to a low-carbon electricity sector. 
Ultimately, electricity consumers will fund any investment in the NSW electricity industry, 
whether public or private, through their electricity bills. Public retention of existing assets 
and strong investment in energy efficiency offers the strongest potential to keep electricity 
bills down. 
Consumer impact 
The four scenarios presented above have quite different impacts on consumers. The cost of 
energy service provision is higher under private ownership due to the higher cost of capital 
investment. This additional cost will inevitably be passed on to consumers. 
In addition to these short-term consumer impacts, there will be long-term consumer impacts 
under any scenario that does not respond urgently to climate change. These impacts are of 
two kinds. First, there are the negative impacts of climate change on the NSW economy. 
Second, as demonstrated by Stern (2006), the cost of responding to climate change increases 
over time. Delayed response is more costly than responding now. The Owen Inquiry and 
Revised Owen scenarios delay serious climate change response and therefore incur greater 
eventual costs to consumers.  
The only scenario that avoids the higher cost of private ownership and the higher cost of 
delayed climate change response is the Strong Climate Change Response (public) scenario. 
This scenario has clear benefits for consumers. 
Concluding remarks 
The scenario that strikes the best balance between environmental protection, economic well-
being and consumer impacts is the Strong Climate Change Response (public) scenario. This 
scenario demonstrates that it is possible to achieve a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
over the next 10 years without the need for privatisation and without putting supply 
reliability at risk. The NSW Government should put its efforts into realising this scenario, 
rather than investing time and resources in an unnecessary and potentially 
counterproductive push for privatisation. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In April 1995, all Australian governments reached agreement on a National Competition 
Policy (NCP) for Australia. The objectives of the NCP included restructuring of public sector 
monopoly businesses and application of competitive neutrality principles to government 
businesses. 
The electricity industry was a key target for restructuring and reform. At the time, statutory 
authorities in each State were responsible for electricity supply. These authorities were 
widely perceived as inefficient and overstaffed, with poor labour productivity. Further, 
many of the State authorities had significant excess generating capacity as a result of overly 
optimistic electricity demand forecasts (Evans 2004). Improvements had been made; public 
sector reforms during the 1980s and early 1990s had resulted in a ‘more streamlined and 
commercially oriented’ electricity industry (Evans 2004, p.20) with improved productivity 
(McDonell 2004). The introduction of competitive energy markets was expected to deliver 
further productivity gains (Commonwealth of Australia 1993). 
The principles established under the NCP for electricity reform sought ‘separation of 
transmission, distribution, supply and generation, and creation of a distribution and supply 
industry capable of providing effective bidders to generators in a competitive national 
market’ (McDonell 2004, p.81). A key element of the reforms was the establishment by the 
State Governments of the National Electricity Market (NEM), a physical wholesale spot 
market for electricity. The NEM delivers electricity to large users and electricity retailers, 
which in turn supply almost 90% of the Australian population, covering Queensland, NSW, 
ACT, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania (MacGill, Outhred & Nolles 2006). In the NEM, 
generators bid every five minutes to supply the market with a specified amount of electricity 
at a specified price. The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) 
determines which bids to accept to meet prevailing demand at the lowest cost. 
The other major element of electricity industry reform was the disaggregation and 
corporatisation or privatisation of state electricity authorities. In NSW, the Electricity 
Commission of NSW (ECNSW) was responsible for electricity generation and transmission; 
distribution and retail were the responsibility of 25 separate businesses. After a process of 
restructuring, corporatisation and mergers, the following government-owned corporations 
emerged: 
• Macquarie Generation, owner of the coal-fired Bayswater and Liddell Power Stations 
• Delta Electricity, owner of the coal-fired Mt Piper, Wallerawang, Vales Point and 
Munmorah Power Stations 
• Eraring Energy, owner of the coal-fired Eraring Power Station 
• TransGrid, owner of the high voltage electricity transmission network in NSW 
• Three combined distribution and retail businesses – EnergyAustralia, Integral Energy 
and Country Energy. 
Electricity assets in NSW and Tasmania remain in public ownership. In contrast, the 
electricity industry in Victoria and South Australia was completely privatised. In 
Queensland, the Gladstone Power Station was privatised in 1994 and the retail operations of 
the State-owned energy businesses were sold in 2007; the other electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution businesses remain in public ownership. In the ACT, there is a 
joint venture between the privately-owned AGL and government-owned ACTEW 
Corporation. 
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In 1997, the first Carr Government in NSW also sought to privatise the electricity industry 
but this policy was fiercely opposed by trade unions (McDonell 2004). The unions and their 
allies succeeded in rejecting the proposal at the 1997 Labor Party State conference. 
Subsequently, the defeat of the Liberal-National Coalition in the 1999 NSW election has been 
attributed to its support for privatisation (McDonell 2004). At the time, privatisation was 
criticised on economic, social and environmental grounds (Public Sector Research Centre 
1997). The issue of privatisation subsequently faded from political debate and the electricity 
industry in NSW remained in public ownership. 
Privatisation of the electricity industry returned to the agenda in NSW in 2006, when the 
NSW Government, Victorian Government and Australian Government proposed to privatise 
Snowy Hydro. The privatisation plans came to nothing, after the Australian Government 
withdrew from the proposed sale in the face of strong public opposition. However, a new 
recommendation for privatisation of electricity assets in NSW has emerged from the recent 
Owen Inquiry into Electricity Supply in NSW. 
The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) commissioned the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures (ISF) at the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) to consider the economic case 
for and against privatisation of electricity assets in NSW. This report reviews Australian and 
international experiences with electricity privatisation, critically examines the case for 
privatisation made by the Owen Report and proposes alternatives that have the potential to 
deliver a more sustainable future for the NSW electricity industry. 
1.2 The Owen Inquiry into Electricity Supply in NSW 
In its 2006 Statement of Opportunities, NEMMCO projected that NSW would require 
327MW of additional electricity generating capacity to reliably meet projected demand by 
2010/11 (NEMMCO 2006). On 9 May 2007, as part of its response to this forecast deficit in 
future electricity generating capacity, the NSW Government invited Professor Anthony 
Owen to undertake an Inquiry into Electricity Supply in NSW. Professor Owen is Professor of 
Energy Economics in the School of Economics and Finance at Curtin University of 
Technology in Western Australia. He was previously a Director of the Centre for Energy and 
Environmental Markets at the University of NSW. 
The NSW Government provided the Owen Inquiry with the following terms of reference: 
1. Review the need and timing for new baseload generation that maintains both security 
of supply and competitively priced electricity. 
2. Examine the baseload options available to efficiently meet any emerging generation 
needs. 
3. Review the timing and feasibility of technologies and/or measures available both 
nationally and internationally that reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
4. Determine the conditions needed to ensure investment in any emerging generation, 
consistent with maintaining the NSW AAA Credit Rating. 
The Owen Inquiry sought submissions from interested individuals, organisations and peak 
groups with an interest in the future of electricity supply in NSW. It received 72 submissions. 
Professor Owen also met with a range of stakeholder groups, including market and 
regulatory bodies, peak industry bodies, individual market participants, environmental 
groups and groups representing small and large energy consumers. 
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In addition, the Owen Inquiry commissioned three expert reports to provide more detailed 
information: 
• A report by Connell Wagner (2007) on NSW power generation and CO2 emissions 
reduction technology options 
• A report by Wood Mackenzie (2007) on availability and cost of gas for NSW baseload 
generation 
• A report by Morgan Stanley (2007) on securing private investment in new generation 
in NSW. 
After considering all of this information, Professor Owen delivered his report on 11 
September 2007 (Owen 2007) and the NSW Government is expected to announce its response 
soon. In brief, the report identifies a need for additional investment in baseload generation 
by 2013-14 and recommends privatisation of state-owned generation and retail businesses. 
Section 3.1 provides additional detail on the findings of the Owen Inquiry. 
1.3 Alternative perspectives 
The release of the Owen Report prompted mixed reactions. Energy industry associations 
(e.g. ESAA 2007) and private sector participants in the energy industry (e.g. Origin Energy 
2007) welcomed the recommendations. In contrast, environmental groups and unions 
rejected the recommendations, citing concerns about the impacts on greenhouse gas 
emissions, workers and consumers (ABC 2007). 
The Total Environment Centre (TEC) released an environmental scorecard on the Owen 
Report, giving it a rating of 14 out of 60 (TEC 2007). The major criticism was as follows: 
The Owen Report makes the basic mistake of failing to properly evaluate the contribution that 
can be made by energy efficiency. As a result it is only half a report and wrongly recommends 
a new baseload power station on a premature timeframe (TEC 2007, p.1). 
From a social perspective, Unions NSW raised concerns about job losses and higher prices 
flowing from privatisation (ABC 2007). The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (2007a) echoed 
these concerns: 
Privatisation often leads to cost-cutting and job losses, as companies try to maximise their 
returns to shareholders. This also leads to pressure for greater deregulation. Interstate and 
overseas experience shows that this usually results in residential consumers being charged 
higher prices. 
It is clear, therefore, that the prospect of electricity industry privatisation in NSW draws out 
conflicting opinions. This report considers the case for and against privatisation from the 
perspective of long-term sustainability. Sustainability is commonly recognised as having 
three interrelated dimensions: economic well-being, environmental protection and 
restoration, and social justice. Therefore, this report examines the economic, environmental 
and social case for and against privatisation. The focus is particularly on the economic case, 
as the arguments for privatisation in the Owen Report are primarily framed in economic 
terms. 
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1.4 Research questions 
Consistent with the above, this report particularly addresses the following questions: 
• What do previous experiences with electricity industry privatisation tell us about the 
likely experience in NSW? 
• Is a baseload power station really needed to ensure security of supply in NSW? 
• Whether or not a baseload power station is needed, is privatisation in the long-term 
economic interest of electricity consumers (and taxpayers)? 
• Are there alternatives to the approach recommended in the Owen Report that would 
deliver more sustainable outcomes? 
• If the NSW Government decides to privatise, what environmental and consumer 
protection measures are required to deliver a sustainable outcome? 
1.5 Report structure 
The report is structured as follows: 
• Section 2reviews Australian and international experiences with electricity industry 
privatisation to provide a foundation for understanding the likely impact of 
privatisation in NSW 
• Section 3 provides a detailed critical review of the case for privatisation outlined in 
the Owen Report 
• Section 4 presents three alternatives to the Owen Report recommendations 
• Section 5 concludes with a sustainability assessment of these alternatives. 
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2  Experiences of electric ity industry privat isat ion 
This section reviews positive and negative experiences of electricity industry privatisation 
outside NSW. While the NSW context is unique, the general experiences of privatisation 
elsewhere are likely to be indicative of experiences in NSW. Table 1, at the end of this 
section, summarises the benefits, costs and risks of privatisation based on experiences 
elsewhere. 
In considering previous experiences with electricity industry privatisation, it is important to 
distinguish between the impacts of privatisation and the impacts of the market reforms that 
preceded or followed privatisation. Privatisation is only one step in a longer process that 
usually includes disaggregation of State-owned entities, may include corporatisation and 
often includes deregulation or re-regulation. These other steps may also have positive or 
negative impacts on the economy, environment or consumers. While it is difficult to tease 
out the specific impacts of privatisation, we have tried to focus in this section on impacts 
resulting from privatisation rather than associated reforms. 
Section 2.1 focuses on privatisation of electricity assets in Victoria and South Australia. 
Section 2.2 provides a short overview of international experiences and then focuses on the 
United Kingdom (UK). 
2.1 Australian experiences 
One of the many reforms that have taken place within the Australian electricity industry has 
been the privatisation of state electricity industries in both Victoria and South Australia. The 
privatisations in South Australia and Victoria have followed disaggregation and 
corporatisation of government owned electricity service providers as well as competition 
reforms as detailed in Section 1.1. 
The privatisations have been both highly praised and highly criticised. For example, Moran 
considers the corporatisation and competition reforms followed by privatisation to have 
‘formed one of the cornerstones of the remarkable productivity surge from which Australia 
benefited in the 1990s’ (Moran 2004, p.139-140). Conversely, Beder has slammed the 
privatisations saying that ‘the benefits that were supposed to follow from reduced 
government budget deficits as the result of selling electricity systems have turned out to be a 
mirage in most cases’(Beder 2006, p. 61). It is interesting to note that the State Governments 
responsible for these privatisations were each defeated at subsequent elections. 
2.1.1 Victoria 
The Victorian electricity industry experienced many changes after a decision in 1994 by the 
Kennett government to disaggregate and privatise the State Electricity Commission of 
Victoria (SECV). During the period 1995-96, the state’s five distribution businesses and single 
generation company were sold to private investors. The stated objectives of the sell off were: 
to realise efficiency gains and therefore price reductions; to transfer commercial risk to the 
private sector and away from taxpayers and customers; to promote contestability in the 
supply of services; and, to reduce public debt (Victorian Auditor-General’s Office 1996). 
Following the privatisation, prices in the contestable markets dropped to a level lower than 
many had expected and the sale appeared to have been a success with many of the expected 
benefits apparently realised (Quiggin 2002). Quiggin explains that the drop in prices was a 
reflection of oversupply and ‘the willingness of market participants to use the cash flow from 
vesting contracts to subsidise unprofitable or marginally profitable contracts in contestable 
markets’ (Quiggin 2002, p.9). As a result ‘retail prices of electricity in Victoria generally 
improved compared to price levels prior to privatisation, both for contestable and non-
contestable customers’ (Ward & Hodge 2001, p.49). 
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Many saw the sale as successfully enabling the government to wipe clear the State’s debt 
after the sale achieved higher than expected asset sale prices (Moran 2004). Moran considers 
the Victorian project to have resulted in ‘a classic win-win outcome’ for the state (Moran 
2004, p.139). However Quiggin’s analysis of the fiscal impacts of the privatisation shows 
otherwise. Quiggin concedes that in comparison to other privatisation projects in Australia, 
the sale of the Victorian electricity industry might be considered a success, but stresses that 
‘if a successful sale barely yields a break-even outcome, the viability of privatisation as a 
method of improving public finances must be regarded as doubtful’ (Quiggin 2002, p.13). He 
argues that the fiscal impact of the privatisation on the public sector was more or less neutral 
as ‘the interest savings realised by selling the assets were about equal to the earnings those 
assets would have generated under continued public ownership’ (Quiggin 2002, p.12). 
It has also been claimed that the privatisation led to technical efficiency and labour 
productivity benefits. For example, Ward and Hodge argue that: 
The time availability of generators to produce power increased from around 80 per cent in the 
four years leading up to 1992-93, to around 90 per cent in the two years following 
privatisation. Labour productivity in terms of electricity generated per employee tripled as 
well, though these figures are difficult to interpret since following privatisation, external 
contractors carried out a much greater proportion of the work (Ward & Hodge 2004, p.48, 
citing ESAA 1995; 1997; 1999; 2000). 
On the other hand, it could be argued that this improvement of availability would have 
happened regardless of privatisation. With the institution of the NEM, the Victorian brown 
coal generators had greater scope to sell their relatively cheap power and more incentive to 
operate for longer periods. 
The refurbishment of the Hazelwood power station is also used to support the claim that 
privatisation had brought about technical efficiency improvements, as it had previously been 
scheduled for closure after a record of very low availability factors (Quiggin 2002, Ward & 
Hodge 2004). Some thought this a symbol of the success of the privatisation project and 
demonstration of a technical efficiency benefit being delivered by the private sector. On the 
other hand, extending the life of this old power station complete with 1950s technology is 
cause for concern for many because of its status as Australia’s most greenhouse polluting 
power station (Environment Victoria 2003). Clearly, there are environmental factors which 
were overlooked in the process of privatisation. 
Beder’s view of the privatisation was less positive. In short she considers the privatisation to 
have failed to deliver the promised benefits of efficiency, lower prices and better service for 
electricity consumers (Beder 2003). Beder (2003) claims that any efficiency gains that could 
have been achieved by slashing the workforce occurred in the lead up to the privatisation, 
and under government ownership these benefits could have been passed through to 
consumers in the order of a 30 per cent price reduction. 
Beder (2003) also discusses how the high asset prices were of concern due to the large 
amount of corporate debt required to fund these prices. As the debt came at a higher price 
than government debt, ‘analysts claimed that the cost savings available to the private sector 
would not be enough for them to make a profit and service the debt, and therefore they 
would inevitably have to increase electricity prices or go out of business’ (Beder 2003, p.236).  
In terms of the impact on service quality for consumers, Ward and Hodge (2004) discuss how 
following privatisation the average length of time customers spent “off supply” declined and 
the number of customers disconnected for non-payment fell by around two-thirds for 
residential customers since 1995 and halved for business customers. However, Quiggin 
(2002) sees the privatisation and regulatory change to have impacted on consumers in 
differing ways depending on their desirability to retailers. He discusses how the more 
attractive consumers such as business and high income households have benefited the most 
through greater choice and, in many cases, lower average prices, whilst ‘by contrast, 
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suppliers have sought to dump less desirable customers or to force them into residualist 
arrangements designed to minimise the costs of serving them’ (Quiggin 2002, p.12). 
Further, Sharam (2004) believes that ‘the reform of the electricity industry in Victoria has 
directly influenced a growth in demand for electricity that will require very substantial levels 
of new investment in generation and network services, resulting in price increases for 
customers’ (Sharam 2004, p.151). Sharam argues that incentives for consumption were 
implicit in the regulatory approach and led to ‘retailers such as AGL offering domestic 
customers no-deposit, 12-month interest free loans for the purchase of refrigerative air 
conditioning’ (Sharam 2004, p.147).  
Thomas (2004) agrees that with a field of competing retailers companies will make more 
money the more power they sell whereas under government control, ‘generators can be 
instructed as to what technologies to deploy and measures can be taken to ensure that the 
profits of retailers are not dependent on how much power they sell’ (Thomas 2006, p.13). 
Privatisation may make it more difficult to ensure that environmental concerns are 
appropriately addressed; regulatory changes become more difficult after privatisation 
because private owners are much more likely to resist government policy changes that they 
perceive to impact on their commercial interests. 
The response to the privatisation project in Victoria has been mixed. While some believe it to 
have been a success in delivering reduced budget debt and increasing technical and labour 
efficiency, others claim that the fiscal impact was neutral, consumer benefits were not as 
promised and the outcome was environmentally unfavourable. 
2.1.2 South Australia 
The South Australian Government gave a similar rationale to the Victorian privatisation 
when it chose to privatise the Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA). It was thought that 
South Australia’s entry into the NEM would carry a range of risks to taxpayers, which the 
government hoped to eliminate through privatisation (Spoehr 2004). The retirement of state 
government debt was another motivation even though ETSA had contributed strongly to 
state revenue over the decade before. The retail component of ETSA was sold and the 
generation, transmission and distribution components were divested through long-term 
leases. 
Despite widespread community opposition, the government proceeded with the 
privatisation in 1999.  Following the introduction of Full Retail Contestability (FRC), the 
hostility towards privatisation deepened as ‘both business and household consumers faced 
price hikes of around 30 per cent, exposing many in the community to great financial 
hardship’ (Spoehr 2004, p 74). There were reports of low-income families, in the effort to 
avoid disconnection or late payment fees, having to forgo essential items such as food and 
medication (Adelaide University 2004). The Government of South Australia’s Strategic 
Infrastructure Plan concludes that ‘the privatisation of South Australia’s electricity system 
has resulted in increased prices charged to business and household consumers’ (DTEI 2007, 
p. 125). 
Analysis undertaken by Spoehr and Quiggin ‘indicates that the privatisation of ETSA has not 
only fuelled spiralling prices, but denied the State Budget the substantial dividends that 
would have flowed from ETSA to help fund education, health and other services’ (Adelaide 
University 2004).  
According to Quiggin (2001) the privatisation resulted in a reduction in public sector net 
worth. Quiggin (2001) argues that this is consistent with most Australian experiences of 
privatisation, explaining that: 
South Australia is an electricity importer, so the bulk of the sale price (more than $4 billion out 
of a total of $5 billion) was realised through the sale of transmission and distribution assets. In 
the final year of ownership, earning before interest and tax were $368 million, of which the 
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distribution and transmission assets contributed $300 million. In the absence of regulatory 
decisions that reduce the nominal return to these assets, the interest savings on the sale price 
will fall consistently short of the earnings foregone through privatisation (Quiggin 2001, p. 
28). 
Furthermore, the South Australian Department for Transport, Energy and Infrastructure 
(DTEI) (2007) note that ‘augmentation of the system to meet increased demand has been 
made more difficult by privatisation’ (DTEI 2007, p. 125). According to the Government, 
under public ownership ‘augmentation of the system proceeded somewhat in advance of 
demand and associated costs were amortised over a long period of time’ (DTEI 2007, p. 125). 
The South Australian electricity privatisation project has largely resulted in negative impacts 
for consumers and although the government did achieve an improvement in the state’s 
credit rating, some argue that it resulted in a reduction in public sector net worth (e.g. 
Quiggin 2001). The South Australian case does not instil confidence that privatisation can 
deliver its purported benefits in every case. 
2.2 International experiences 
Changes in the way electricity industries are organised, including privatisations, have 
occurred around the world over the past decade. In some cases countries have sought to 
copy reforms undertaken by countries such as the UK. In other cases, and particularly in the 
case of developing countries, re-organisations or privatisations have occurred in response to 
pressure from donor agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), whose loans for example, are frequently conditional on such actions (Parker 2004, 
Thomas 2006). Thomas provides an example of IMF and World Bank influence in Cameroon, 
where such ‘conditions imposed a privatisation which resulted in the creation of a private, 
poorly regulated, vertically integrated monopoly’ (Pineau 2002 in Thomas 2004, p. 2). 
In addition to these influences, countries have been attracted to the touted benefits of 
privatisation such as improved efficiency and the prospect of attractive revenue receipts. 
Other drivers of change include the general perception of state-run enterprises being 
technically inefficient and overstaffed, and the ‘need for more electricity capacity which the 
state is deemed to be unable to fund’ (Parker 2004, p. 216). 
However, in spite of these pressures, in a number of developing countries, plans for 
privatisations or re-organisations have been dropped after governments have reviewed 
experiences in other countries or in response to strong public opposition (Thomas 2006). For 
example, in 2004 the Korean Government made the decision to halt its electricity reform 
program, which had aimed to introduce market competition and privatisation to the 
industry (Lee & Ahn 2004). A joint study team was tasked with reviewing the validity of the 
government’s plan; they reported that ‘the alleged benefits of reform are theoretical and 
uncertain, while the real costs and risks are substantial’ (Lee & Ahn 2004, p. 1115). 
Also, in the United States, many of the states which deregulated their electricity industries 
back in the 1990s in order to induce competition have begun ‘rolling back their initiatives or 
returning money to individuals and businesses’ (Johnston 2007, p.1). For example, ‘the 
Illinois legislature last month approved a $1 billion rate-relief package’ (Davidson 2007, p.1). 
This has been in response to findings showing that energy costs have risen faster in the 
deregulated states (Johnston 2007, p.1). 
According to Beder, around the world, ‘the privatisation of electricity is not something that 
citizens have demanded or wanted’ and in general the level of public consultation on such 
reforms has been limited; the issue has sparked many angry protests (Beder 2006, p. 57). 
Beder provides examples of such protests; in the Dominican Republic ‘several people were 
killed during protests against blackouts imposed by privatised companies’ and in Papua 
New Guinea ‘students were killed when thousands rallied against the planned privatisation 
of government services including Elcom, the electricity authority’ (Beder 2006, p. 57). 
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2.2.1 United Kingdom 
The UK’s electricity industry was its biggest privatisation. In 1987, with little forewarning, 
the Thatcher government announced it would privatise the industry. The privatisation was 
largely complete by 1991 (Beder 2003). The overall outcome of the privatisation has been a 
matter of controversy (Stubbs & Macatangay 2002). 
According to Parker (2004), the privatisation ‘led to a significant rise in economic efficiency 
in the industry’. For example, there was a dramatic increase in the amount of electricity 
provided by new cost efficient combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant (Parker 2004). 
Labour efficiencies were also realised, as demonstrated by a fall in the number of employees 
in the sector in the order of 50,000 (Parker 2004). At the same time the amount of electricity 
supplied increased (Parker 2004).  
Electricity bills reduced in real terms by around 2.5 per cent following privatisation, however 
the decline was probably due more to lower fuel costs during the 1990s than as a result of 
privatisation (Beder 2003, Parker 2004). Beder (2003) believes that prices would have fallen if 
the industry had remained under public ownership, but ‘in the new world of private 
electricity the greatest gain from those fuel cost reductions went to shareholders rather than 
consumers’ (Beder 2003, p. 205). Branston’s price analysis of British electricity privatisation 
concludes that ‘observed prices are indeed significantly higher than they would have been 
had privatisation not occurred’ (Branston 2000, p.31). 
Stubbs and Macatangay (2002) argue that ‘the fall in costs was not matched by a similar fall 
in prices, as corporate profits grew in the mid-1990s and shareholders made substantial 
capital gains’ (Stubbs & Macatangay 2002, p. 123). Beder (2003) also contends that: 
Although British prices for electricity have fallen since privatisation, the decrease has been a 
fraction of the real reduction in costs involved in producing and supplying electricity. Retail 
prices for small households still remain high by European and US standards, and many 
countries that have not liberalised their electricity markets continue to offer cheaper electricity 
(Beder 2003, p. 219). 
The UK experience also demonstrated that, even with a privatised industry, the 
responsibility for ensuring access to an essential service always falls back on the government 
and therefore taxpayers. For example, in 2002, almost all of the independent generators 
collapsed after the wholesale electricity price dropped and ‘at one point, about 40 per cent of 
the [sic] Britain’s generating capacity was owned by collapsed companies’ (Thomas 2006, p. 
6). At a huge cost to UK taxpayers, the government had to rescue the privatised nuclear 
company British Energy after its collapse (Thomas 2006). This experience reveals an 
unresolved tension associated with the competitive supply of electricity; in a truly 
competitive market, there must always be a risk of an electricity supplier going out of 
business, whereas political realities mean that the supply of electricity cannot be allowed to 
fail. 
Privatisation in the UK appears to have deterred investment in conservation and energy 
efficiency as Beder explains that ‘the original privatisation legislation provided no incentives 
to electricity suppliers to conserve energy or encourage efficiency. In their absence, the 
suppliers’ only incentive was to sell as much electricity as possible’ (Beder 2003, p. 217).  
Beder (2003) believes that ‘the success of the British electricity privatisation experiment was 
greatly exaggerated by proponents who sought to spread the gospel elsewhere’ and that in 
the initial years ‘the biggest beneficiaries were the private companies themselves, reaping 
huge profits and paying out large dividends and executive salaries’ (Beder 2003, p.221). 
More recent developments in the UK electricity industry have seen the retail market become 
highly concentrated by the so called ‘Big Six’ energy suppliers; British Gas, EDF Energy, 
Npower, Powergen, Scottish and Southern Energy and Scottish Power.  Last year saw the 
‘Big Six’ levy 14 major price rises between them (Energywatch 2007b). As a result of this 
market concentration, ‘the advantages liberalisation has brought to UK household 
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consumers have been eroded over the last two years’ (Energywatch 2007b, p. 4). Between 
2004 and 2006, residential electricity prices increased by 16% in real terms in the UK 
compared to 8% in six peer EU nations (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland and Italy) 
over an equivalent period (Energywatch 2007b). 
The UK experience demonstrates the need to consider the number of competing energy 
businesses that may result after implementing reforms such as privatisation. There is a risk 
that concentration in the market could reach unacceptable levels, stifling effective 
competition and leading to poor outcomes for household consumers (PIAC 2007b, p. 5).  
2.3 Discussion 
Whilst Victoria, South Australia and the United Kingdom have completely privatised their 
electricity industries, in many other countries, reform programs have stopped short of full 
privatisation. Where the private sector has entered an industry, governments have ‘tended to 
retain a strategic shareholding, mindful of the economic and social importance of reliable 
electricity supplies’ (Parker 2004, p. 226).  
Evidence from overseas and interstate suggests that privatisation has the potential to result 
in diminished levels of service delivery and negative impacts on electricity consumers; while 
on the other hand, there has been evidence of improved efficiency and productivity gains for 
the industry. Furthermore, whether the sale of electricity industry assets can improve a 
state’s budgetary position is questionable. As Beder explains, ‘governments do not gain in 
the long-term if the savings in interest repayments, together with the tax payments from the 
new private companies, are less than the combination of lost dividends and additional costs 
resulting from privatisation’ (Beder 2007, p.8).  
It would appear that privatisation brings a mixture of positive and negative outcomes. For 
example, Quiggin (2002) notes that ‘whereas the spare capacity maintained by public 
infrastructure enterprises may have been excessive, private enterprises tend to maintain too 
little capacity, reflecting the fact that most of the costs of systems failure are borne by the 
community as a whole’ (Quiggin 2002, p. 10). Also, while privatisation projects have 
apparently improved economic efficiency they have also resulted in reductions in 
employment and loss of job security for employees. Beder notes also that:  
Private companies, freed from social obligations, are able to undertake profitable activities 
whilst the government continues to pay for unprofitable aspects of electricity supply like 
environmental protection and equitable access. Previously governments were able to 
subsidise the unprofitable activities with the profitable ones. The inability to spread costs 
across a whole service means more expense to taxpayers and savings to industry (Beder 2006, 
p.61) 
Megginson and Netter (2001) in their survey of empirical studies of privatisation, conclude 
that strong evidence exists to show that privatisation improves operating performance, but 
caution that the expected benefits of privatisation may be undermined by poor regulation. 
Megginson and Netter (2001) recommend that further investigation is required to ‘examine 
the sequencing and staging of privatisation’ and whether ‘reforms other than government 
divestiture can effectively serve as a substitute for privatisation’ (Megginson & Netter 2001, 
p. 49). They add that until these aspects are addressed, ‘large-scale privatisation programs 
will remain a leap of faith’ (Megginson & Netter 2001, p. 49).  
Further, Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) in their analysis of the economic impact of regulatory 
reforms in the electricity supply industry find that they ‘cannot draw a strong conclusion as 
to the effect of private ownership’ (Hattori & Tsutsui 2004, p. 830). Hodge (2004) has also 
commented on the lack of independent analysis and academic evaluation saying that ‘several 
years after these privatisations and restructuring activities, so little has been formally 
researched and so few policy assessments have been completed’.  
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The circumstances of each privatisation project have been unique and experiences of 
electricity privatisation generally appear to be mixed. While the NSW context is likewise 
unique, lessons can be learnt from privatisation experiences elsewhere. For example, if NSW 
were to achieve as positive an outcome as did Victoria in terms of asset prices, there would 
remain a risk that the outcome may be only fiscally neutral at best. Table 1 below 
summarises the claimed benefits and claimed costs or risks of electricity industry 
privatisation as identified in the literature. Many of these claims are contradictory, and the 
reality may lie somewhere between these two extremes. Nevertheless, these claims need to 
be kept in mind for the review of the specific case for privatisation in NSW that follows in 
Section 3. 
Claimed Benefits Claimed Costs/Risks 
• Improvement to public 
finances 
• Transfer of commercial risk to 
private sector 
• Reduction in electricity prices 
• Labour productivity increases 
• Improvement in generator 
availability 
• Reduced number of 
disconnections 
• Refurbishment of old plant 
• Investment in more efficient 
power stations 
• Greater choice for consumers 
• Loss of revenue-generating assets 
• No improvement to public finances 
• Increase in electricity prices 
• Job losses and increased use of 
external contractors 
• Negative environmental outcome 
due to refurbishment of old polluting 
plant 
• Negative environmental outcome as 
no incentive to reduce consumption 
• High level of corporate debt and 
increased risk of company collapses 
and government bail outs 
• Negative impacts on vulnerable 
consumers 
• Greater potential for coercion of 
customers to switch retailers 
Table 1:  Claimed benef its and costs/r isks of electr ic ity industry pr ivatisation 
from li terature  review. 
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3  A crit ical review of the case for privat isat ion in 
NSW 
Section 2 demonstrated that Australian and international experiences of electricity industry 
privatisation have not been universally positive. In fact, there is credible evidence for net 
negative impacts on the economy and on consumers. Given these previous experiences, 
there is no basis for simply assuming that privatisation will deliver economic benefits. 
Instead, it falls on the Owen Report (and subsequently the NSW Government) to build a 
credible, evidence-based case for why privatisation will deliver benefits in NSW. This section 
critically reviews the case for privatisation put forward in the Owen Report. It examines the 
evidence for and against key elements of the case for privatisation. 
Section 3.1 begins with a brief summary of the findings of the Owen Report. Subsequent 
sections review each of the main elements of the argument for privatisation in more detail. 
3.1 Summary of findings 
The key recommendation of the Owen Report is as follows: 
On the basis of submissions made to the Inquiry, together with expert consultant reports, I have 
determined that there is a need to be prepared for additional investment in baseload from 2013-
14. Further, the most efficient means of providing for baseload is to improve the commercial 
and policy signals used by the private sector when investing in generation capacity in New 
South Wales. My key recommendation, therefore, is that the Government of New South Wales 
divests itself of all State ownership in both retail and generation (Owen 2007, p.i). 
This recommendation emerges from a series of arguments and assumptions that can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Growth in electricity demand will average 1.8 per cent per annum over the next 
decade (Owen 2007, p.iii). As a result ‘New South Wales needs to prepare for 
baseload supply by 2013-14’ (Owen 2007, p.1-7) and needs to start now. 
2. ‘Coal or gas will meet most of the new baseload generation needs’ (Owen 2007, p.1-
8). 
3. ‘The impact on the State could be up to $15 billion to ensure security of supply, 
compliance with regulatory requirements and commercial competitiveness’ (Owen 
2007, p.1-12). 
4. It is preferable that the private sector, rather than the NSW Government, funds this 
investment (Owen 2007, p.v) 
5. The private sector will ‘invest in new generation in the NEM under the right 
conditions (including access to a stable revenue stream, to generation development 
sites and to fuel sources)’ (Owen 2007, p.1-13). 
6. Therefore, the NSW Government should ‘divest the State of the generation businesses 
of Macquarie Generation, Delta Electricity and Eraring Energy’ or ‘implement an 
appropriately structured long-term leasing of current generation assets’ (Owen 2007, 
p.1-14). 
7. The NSW Government should also ‘divest the State of the retail arms of 
EnergyAustralia, Integral Energy and Country Energy’ (Owen 2007, p.1-14) to avoid 
$2 billion to $3 billion in capital investment needed to make these businesses 
competitive (Owen 2007, p.xii) and to provide the private sector with opportunities 
for vertical integration of generation and retail businesses (Owen 2007, p.xiii). 
Each element of the argument for privatisation is considered in more detail below. 
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3.2 Supply and demand projections 
Owen’s argument that a new baseload power station is needed by 2013-14 rests heavily on 
electricity supply and demand projections. These projections are very uncertain and the 
timeframe for a new baseload power station varies significantly depending on the 
assumptions used in projections. Specific issues with the supply and demand projections 
used in the Owen Report are discussed below. 
3.2.1 Demand projections 
The Owen Report uses forecasts prepared by TransGrid to estimate future electricity 
demand. TransGrid prepares Annual Planning Reports (e.g. TransGrid 2007) that set out its 
electricity supply and demand forecasts. The forecasts take into account historical trends, 
economic data and known large industrial loads. They include low, medium and high 
growth scenarios. The forecasts have proven to be quite reliable in recent years (TransGrid 
2007). 
TransGrid forecasts a reduced rate of growth in energy demand over the next 10 years 
(under the medium growth scenario) of 1,600 GWh per annum compared to the historical 
rate of increase of 1,700 GWh per annum over the previous decade (Owen 2007, p.2-6). As a 
result, electricity sent out from major power stations is projected to grow from 73,091 GWh 
in 2005-06 to 87,540 GWh in 2016-17 to meet anticipated demand (Owen 2007, p.2-8). 
Despite the apparent reliability of these demand projections to date, they fail to take into 
account three major issues that could have a significant impact on future demand. First, they 
fail to adequately account for the many new energy efficiency measures that have been 
implemented in recent years. TransGrid’s energy forecast does not ‘explicitly identify the 
contribution that energy efficiency makes to reducing the growth in energy demand’ (Owen 
2007, p.4-2). However, according to Owen (2007, p.4-2), ‘energy efficiency is implicitly 
factored into their work, through their forecast of a continuation of the reduced rate of 
energy demand growth observed since 2001’. This claim is problematic. 
Analysis of long-term trends in Australian energy intensity indicates that the observed 
decline in energy intensity over 1973-74 to 2000-01 is primarily due to changes in the 
structure of the economy and the fuel sources used to meet demand (Tedesco and Thorpe 
2003). The shift towards a service-oriented economy has reduced the energy required by the 
economy. Greater use of natural gas at the point of use, which burns more efficiently than 
other fuels, has also reduced energy requirements. Technical improvements in energy 
efficiency contributed very little to the observed decline in energy intensity up to 2000-01. It 
is reasonable to assume that structural change and changes in the fuel mix, rather than 
technical efficiency improvement, continue to drive much of the observed lower rate of 
growth after 2001. Consequently, by projecting forward the rate of growth after 2001, the 
TransGrid forecast is not accounting for ongoing energy efficiency improvements but for 
ongoing structural changes in the economy and fuel mix. 
Further, although many new energy efficiency initiatives have been introduced since 2001 
(as discussed in Chapter 4 of the Owen Report), most of these have been introduced very 
recently and their impact on energy demand is not yet observable. The most recent actual 
energy demand data used in the Owen Report is for 2005-06, so only initiatives introduced 
by 2004-05 could be expected to have any observable influence on demand, and this would 
only be evident in the final year of data. 
The Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS), BASIX and mandatory efficiency standards 
for appliances would have had some impact on energy demand in 2004-05 and 2005-06 but 
these programs ramp up slowly and most of their impact will only be evident in future 
years. One or two years of data are not sufficient to establish a trend for the purpose of 
projection. 
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More recent programs, like the Climate Change Fund, Energy Savings Action Plans and 
Energy Efficiency Opportunities would not be taken into account at all in the TransGrid 
forecast. In summary, the TransGrid projections fail to adequately incorporate the impact of 
existing energy efficiency measures on future demand. The impact of existing schemes 
should have been estimated and subtracted from the projected demand to give a realistic 
representation of future demand. 
The second problem with the TransGrid demand forecasts is that they do not take account of 
impacts on demand from price increases due to the introduction of emissions trading and a 
carbon price. It is also unclear whether account has been taken of the significant increase in 
electricity prices due to the current massive expansion in network investment. 
The third problem with the TransGrid demand projections is that they take the future as 
given and fail to reflect the urgent need to take strong action to respond to climate change 
over the next decade. There is an emerging consensus that the next decade is critical in 
determining whether we can avoid dangerous climate change. Consider the following 
statement from one of Australia’s leading climate experts, Dr Graeme Pearman: 
I hear people talking about getting our emissions under control by carbon trading and other 
interventions sometime in the next 10 years. We don't really have 10 years…We're bang in the 
middle of the window identified by scientists in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change report - between 2000 and 2015 - when a turnaround might just hold warming to two 
degrees, beyond which the consequences become dire. But there's no sign of it happening. 
You have to recognise the urgency, and it doesn't seem to be there. I'm not making a partisan 
comment, it's not recognised by either of the parties. We really need to scale up the efforts 
nationally and internationally (Chandler 2007). 
The most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) makes it 
clear that if we are to avoid dangerous climate change, we need to act in the next decade to 
transform the way we use energy (IPCC 2007). This requires strong government action to 
improve energy efficiency, reduce energy demand and facilitate the uptake of low-emission 
technologies. In this context, an energy demand forecast that assumes continuation of 
current trends is of little value. Instead, what is needed is an approach that sets appropriate 
greenhouse gas reduction targets and then works out the cheapest way to meet these targets, 
through demand-side and supply-side actions. 
If we are serious about responding to the threat of climate change, governments need to 
implement policies that will reduce demand well below the trends assumed in the Owen 
Report. As Owen (2007, p.4-4) notes: ‘There is a general acceptance in the community that 
there is significant potential to improve the efficiency with which electricity and other forms 
of energy are used’. Governments can, and should, influence future electricity demand by 
helping to realise the potential of energy efficiency. The Owen Report makes no attempt to 
examine a scenario in which the NSW Government pursues strong energy efficiency 
measures that go well beyond those that are currently in place, as a way of responding to 
climate change. This is a serious omission. Section 4 proposes alternative scenarios in which 
there is stronger pursuit of energy efficiency measures as a key way to reduce future 
electricity demand. 
3.2.2 Supply projections 
The Owen Report determines that current and committed large power stations in NSW can 
generate up to 85,000 GWh per annum when operating at maximum technical capacity 
(Owen 2007, p.2-10). Imports from other States may provide additional capacity, ranging 
from zero to 9,000 GWh per annum, depending on the assumptions used (Owen 2007, p.2-
21). Non-scheduled demand (from smaller power stations, including renewable energy) is 
projected to supply 2,050 GWh per annum in 2005-06, growing to 4,000 GWh per annum by 
2016-17 (TransGrid 2007, p.27). 
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It is reasonable to assume that imports from other States may be less available in the future 
due to growth in demand in those States. Therefore, the firm scheduled supply capacity of 
85,000 GWh per annum is the appropriate one to use to determine whether supply is 
sufficient to meet demand. Non-scheduled demand adds to the available energy supply, 
giving a maximum projected generation of 89,000 GWh per annum by 2016-17. 
The key problem with these projections is that they are being rapidly overtaken by events. 
Since these supply projections were developed, there have been major developments in 
renewable energy that will increase the amount of non-scheduled energy available and 
reduce the need for scheduled energy. These include: 
• The announcement of the proposed 1,000MW Silverton Wind Farm, to be constructed 
in western NSW by Epuron. This wind farm alone would provide 3,000 to 3,500 GWh 
of non-scheduled generation each year (AEP 2007) and could be operational by 2010. 
The TransGrid forecast of non-scheduled generation has only an additional 839 GWh 
per year by 2010-11, so this project would provide all of that capacity plus another 
2,161 to 2,661 GWh per year. This extra capacity would directly reduce the need for 
scheduled generation. 
• Additional Australian Government support for renewable energy. Under the newly 
elected Federal Labor Government, annual renewable electricity generation will be 
increased to 60,000 GWh (about 20% of total generation) by 2020. While it is unclear 
how much of this new capacity will be located in NSW, it could significantly increase 
the amount of scheduled and non-scheduled generation. In addition, the Labor Party 
has promised a $500 million Renewable Energy Fund to develop, commercialise and 
deploy renewable energy in Australia (Australian Labor Party 2007). 
These increases in the amount of renewable energy generation above what is assumed in the 
Owen Report raise another issue, which is the ability of distributed generation to meet 
demand closer to the source, with fewer losses. Of the total scheduled generation in 2005-06 
of 76,979 GWh, only 69,210 GWh (90%) reaches the point of end use due to own use by the 
generator and losses during transmission and distribution. Non-scheduled generation is 
typically located closer to loads and has lower losses, so a given quantity of non-scheduled 
generation can substitute for a greater amount of scheduled generation. 
3.2.3 Timing of  investment 
Based on the supply and demand projections, Owen recommends being prepared to build a 
new baseload power station, to be delivering power by 2013-14. He argues that: 
The cost to the State of not being prepared in time is large relative to the cost of investing, with 
hindsight, a little earlier than may have been required. Further, being prepared today does not 
prevent delay in the future if the time horizon for additional baseload requirements moves 
outwards (Owen 2007, p.iii). 
The NSW Government employed a similar argument in relation to the role of desalination in 
supplying water to Sydney. They argued that being ready to construct a desalination plant 
when dam levels fell to a trigger level did not prevent delay if dam levels rose again. As it 
happened, the trigger level was never reached, dam levels did rise and the desalination plant 
is being constructed anyway, so arguments for ‘baseload readiness’ should be considered in 
this light. 
There are two reasons why the 2013-14 date for a new baseload power station may be overly 
cautious. First, under TransGrid’s low demand growth scenario, additional baseload 
capacity is not needed until 2016-17 (Owen 2007, p.2-21).2 This scenario becomes very 
plausible when the impact of existing energy efficiency measures, which are excluded from 
                                                      
2 Under the low growth scenario in Table 2.3 of the Owen Report, 2016-17 is the first year in which the 
currently available capacity of 85,000 GWh per year is exceeded. 
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the TransGrid projections, is taken into account. Indeed, an even lower scenario would be 
plausible with strong additional action on energy efficiency. Strong pursuit of energy 
efficiency could delay the need for additional baseload power until large-scale renewable 
technologies (such as solar thermal and geothermal power) or carbon capture and storage 
plants become commercially available. 
Second, the Silverton Wind Farm and additional renewable energy under an expanded 
MRET could delay the need for a new baseload station to at least 2014-15 and possibly 2015-
16, even under TransGrid’s medium growth scenario. Under the more plausible low growth 
scenario, these developments would push the need for new baseload out beyond 2016-17. 
This will help to buy sufficient time for the development of low-emission baseload options 
that are more consistent with climate change response. For example, ‘Geodynamics expects 
to be able to provide 500MW of baseload to the NEM by 2015-16’ from its low-emission 
geothermal hot dry rock technology (Owen 2007, p.3-11). 
With stronger pursuit of energy efficiency, there is time for a more considered approach that 
gives sufficient attention to climate change response and greenhouse gas reduction and 
allows time to observe the full impact of energy efficiency measures that have already been 
implemented. 
3.3 Choice of technology 
The Owen Report argues that:  
Most of NSW extra baseload energy needs are likely to be met by coal-fired and/or gas-fired 
generation as other technologies can only contribute on a relatively small scale or will not 
mature until 2020 at the earliest…Technologies with minimal carbon emissions, such as Solar 
Thermal, and Geothermal Hot Rock could offer much as baseload generation in the future, 
but not for stations that are to be operational within the next ten years (Owen 2007, p.1-8). 
Further, carbon capture and storage ‘is unlikely to be commercially viable for the next 
tranche of baseload plant in New South Wales’ (Owen 2007, p.vi). 
A major problem with the technology analysis in the Owen Report is that it considers the 
baseload potential of each technology on an individual basis; there is no attempt to consider 
how different technologies might work together to provide baseload substitution. This type 
of analysis is particularly important when considering the role of renewable energy sources, 
which have variable availability. 
While a single wind farm is unable to provide guaranteed baseload, multiple wind farms 
that are sufficiently distributed to take advantage of differing wind regimes can provide 
much more reliable capacity (Diesendorf 2007). Even greater reliability is possible when 
wind power is combined with energy efficiency and other renewable sources, particularly 
biomass and solar thermal power (which both have some storage capacity). 
A diverse portfolio of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies with differing 
generation profiles can provide a firm substitute for baseload power, even when the 
individual technologies cannot. Diesendorf (2005, p.4) shows that: 
a mix of energy supply from natural gas, wind power and bioenergy, together with firm 
implementation of substantial demand-side energy efficiency policies and strategies, could 
economically substitute for both the energy generation and the contribution to the peak load 
of a new 1000 MW coal-fired power station by 2010. 
Diesendorf (2005) does not include solar thermal power, but recent developments in this 
technology indicate that it may become commercially viable more quickly than previously 
thought. Ausra, the solar thermal company established by an Australian – Dr David Mills – 
has signed an agreement with several American utilities to deliver at least 1,500MW of solar 
thermal power in the United States over the next five to seven years (Ehrlich 2007). In 
addition, as noted above, Geodynamics expects to deliver 500MW of baseload power to the 
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NEM by 2015-16 (Owen 2007, p.3-11). With these developments, the possibility of using low-
emission energy sources to meet future baseload requirements should not be ruled out. 
There are two other problems with the technology analysis in the Owen Report. First, the 
analysis depends heavily on the assumed price of carbon in a future emissions trading 
market, which remains very uncertain at present. Under a high carbon price, a portfolio of 
renewable energy technologies would be viable immediately and other low-emission 
baseload technologies (such as solar thermal, geothermal hot dry rocks and carbon capture 
and storage) could be developed more rapidly. Second, as shown in Section 3.2, the 
projections used in the Owen Report fail to consider the role of current and future energy 
efficiency measures in delaying the need for new baseload. 
With strong action on energy efficiency to delay the need for a new baseload power station, 
and strong support for low-emission technologies, the NSW Government could avoid the 
need to build any more high-emission power stations. This is the only strategy that can 
reasonably be supported in a carbon-constrained world and the only approach that will put 
the NSW Government on the right path to achieve its target of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 60% from 2000 levels by 2050. 
3.4 Scale of investment 
According to the Owen Report, the scale of future NSW Government investment required to 
‘ensure compliance with regulatory requirements and commercial competitiveness’ is 
between $12 billion and $15 billion (Owen 2007, p.v). These figures have the following 
components: 
• $7 billion to $8 billion investment in new generation capacity over the next 10 to 15 
years (Owen 2007, p.iv) 
• $2 billion to $3 billion investment in the State-owned retail businesses to ‘adjust their 
business model to suit the competitive environment in which they operate’ (Owen 
2007, p.v) 
• $3 billion to $4 billion to retrofit some existing power stations with carbon reduction 
technologies over the next 10 to 15 years (Owen 2007, p.v). 
In addition, the NSW Government is investing an estimated $10 billion in the electricity 
transmission and distribution network over the next four years (Owen 2007, p.v). Clearly, the 
scale of this projected investment and its impact on the State’s finances is a key driver behind 
the current push for privatisation. It is therefore important to consider how these estimates 
were derived. 
3.4.1 Investment in generation 
The methodology used to arrive at the estimates of the scale of investment is outlined in 
Appendix 6 of the Owen Report. To determine generation investment costs, the Owen 
Report used a simulated generation investment pathway for NSW from NEMMCO (2006). 
This investment pathway, which was actually developed to assess the viability of inter-
regional transmission upgrades, appears to seriously overestimate the actual capacity 
increases required in NSW. It proposes additional investment in 750MW of open cycle gas 
turbine power to become operational between 2009-10 to 2011-12, 770MW of combined cycle 
gas turbine power between 2010-11 and 2011-12 and 2,000MW of coal-fired power between 
2012-13 and 2015-16 (Owen 2007, p.A6-2). At the capacity factors used in the Owen Report, 
these plants could deliver more than 20,000 GWh/year of additional power by 2015-16. Yet 
the shortfall identified by the Owen Report for 2015-16 is only in the order of 6,000 
GWh/year. The assumed generation investment used in the Owen Report would deliver a 
huge amount of surplus capacity and is unjustifiable. 
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A more reasonable investment assumption can be developed by examining NEMMCO’s 
2007 Statement of Opportunities (NEMMCO 2007), which finds that additional capacity of 
134MW is required in NSW by 2013-14 to ensure supply reliability, growing to around 
1,100MW by 2016-17. This could be met by combined cycle gas power or coal power coming 
on-line progressively from 2013-14. If we rule out coal-fired generation due to its greenhouse 
gas intensity and assume that this shortfall will be supplied using CCGT, an appropriate 
investment pathway would have 385MW of generation coming on-line each year from 2013-
14 to 2016-17. This would deliver an additional 1,540MW of capacity by 2016-17. At a 
capacity factor of 70%3, this capacity would deliver an additional 9,400 GWh per year by 
2016-17, which is sufficient to meet the shortfall identified by the Owen Report under 
TransGrid’s medium growth forecast. 
Of course, as discussed in detail above, the need for much of this investment is questionable 
once the impact of existing energy efficiency measures and support for renewable energy is 
taken into account. A more likely scenario is presented in Section 4. 
Even if the scale of generation investment proposed in the Owen Report is accepted at face 
value, it is far from clear that the cost of this investment would be $7 billion to $8 billion. The 
method used to cost the capital investment assumed in the Owen Report is not transparently 
documented. However, using the figures provided in Appendix 6 of the Owen Report and 
the limited detail on method, we have calculated the capital investment required as only $4.6 
billion in 2007-08 dollars. Using the more appropriate assumptions about capacity expansion 
discussed above, the cost would be only $1.6 billion over the same period. The impact of 
existing energy efficiency measures and renewable energy installed in response to the 
expanded MRET would further reduce and delay the scale of the necessary investment. 
Without a more transparent discussion of how the $7 billion to $8 billion was derived, it is 
not possible to be confident that this is a reasonable figure. 
An additional problem with the estimate of $7 billion to $8 billion is that it uses new entrant 
costs to estimate the scale of investment. This ignores existing proposals for refurbishment or 
upgrade of existing plants that could deliver increased capacity at lower cost than new 
entrants. An example is Delta Electricity’s proposed upgrade of the Munmorah Power 
Station. Munmorah is excluded from the Owen Report’s consideration of available capacity 
due to its age and reliability problems. An upgrade of Munmorah, as proposed in Delta 
Electricity’s submission to the Inquiry, would deliver 700MW of additional baseload capacity 
at a lower cost than a new coal-fired power station.  
As noted previously, stronger pursuit of energy efficiency could delay investment in 
baseload beyond 2013-14. There is a great deal of evidence that investment in energy 
efficiency would deliver similar outcomes to expansion of baseload capacity at much lower 
cost. As the Owen Report recognises, energy efficiency is ‘regarded as having untapped 
potential to meet energy needs in a reliable and cost-effective manner, with low 
environmental impacts’ (Owen 2007, p.4-4). Indeed, most Australian evidence indicates that 
investments in energy efficiency have short payback periods and a net benefit to Gross 
Domestic Product (MMA 2004; NFEE 2007; The Allen Consulting Group 2004). This is 
supported by international research, which finds that: 
a concerted global effort to boost energy productivity – or the level of output we achieve from 
the energy we consume – would have spectacular results. By capturing the potential available 
from existing technologies with an internal rate of return (IRR) of 10 percent or more, we 
could cut global energy demand growth by half or more over the next 15 years (McKinsey 
Global Institute 2007). 
Similarly, the IPCC (2007, p.13) finds that: ‘Energy efficiency options for new and existing 
buildings could considerably reduce CO2 emissions with net economic benefit. Many 
barriers exist against tapping this potential, but there are also large co-benefits’. 
                                                      
3 This is at the low end of the range specified in Table 3.11 of the Owen Report for baseload CCGT. 
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Capturing the potential of energy efficiency will require investment to remove market and 
institutional barriers. However, the scale of investment required to avoid construction of a 
new baseload power station is very likely to be less than the investment required to build 
such a station. 
3.4.2 Investment in retail  businesses 
The Owen Report argues that capital expenditure of between $2 billion and $3 billion is 
needed to improve the competitiveness of the State-owned retailers (Owen 2007, p.A6-8). 
This expenditure is needed to pursue vertical integration with generation and upstream gas, 
allowing better management of risks and optimisation of returns. The expenditure 
comprises: 
• $1 billion to $2 billion to develop an upstream gas position by acquiring an existing 
upstream gas company or investing in gas exploration 
• $ 1 billion to invest in generation, such as a gas-fired peaking plant. 
The need for this expenditure is not disputed although the precise basis for the estimates is 
not transparently defined in the Owen Report. One point to note, however, is that the best 
way to compete with the privately-owned retailers may not be to mimic their business 
model, as proposed by the Owen Report, but to identify new business models that deliver 
more to customers. Section 5.2.4 proposes an alternative business model. 
3.4.3 Carbon reduction investment 
The Owen Report estimates that an additional $3 billion to $4 billion in capital investment 
might be required from 2020 to retrofit ‘at least one major existing baseload coal plant with 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology over the foreseeable future’ (Owen 2007, p.A6-
7). There is very little basis for this estimate, given that the cost of CCS (if it ever becomes 
commercially available) remains highly uncertain. The method used to allocate emissions 
permits to existing coal-fired power stations also remains uncertain – it is entirely possible 
under the proposed emissions trading schemes that existing power stations will be issued 
with sufficient permits to cover their existing emissions well into the future. Consequently, 
the estimated cost of carbon reduction investment is highly speculative and of little merit in 
building a case for privatisation. 
3.4.4 Discussion 
The discussion above indicates that the total capital investment required by the NSW 
Government if it retains its generation and retail assets could be much lower than the Owen 
Report estimates, perhaps as low as $4 billion (comprising $2 billion to invest in baseload 
CCGT and $2 billion to invest in the retailers). Further, presenting the investment as a lump 
sum is misleading. The investment would be spread over a significant period of time. Using 
the Owen Report’s inflated figures, the investment would amount to $700 million per year 
through to 2013-14, increasing to $1.5 billion per year after that (Owen 2007, p.A6-10). With 
more reasonable figures, the necessary investment would be more like $400 million per year 
through to 2012-13, increasing to $500 million per year in subsequent years. 
This remains a significant investment and it might be higher if the NSW Government chose 
to invest strongly in energy efficiency and renewable energy. It is therefore worth noting that 
investment in energy efficiency and distributed energy (including cogeneration and 
renewable energy) would have the added benefit of reducing the need for electricity network 
investment by reducing peak demand. The NSW Government is intending to spend about 
$10 billion over the next four years on investment in the electricity network (Owen 2007, 
p.v). Some of this money could be much better spent on energy efficiency and demand 
management, bringing the dual benefit of reducing the need for spending on network 
augmentation and delaying the need to spend on new baseload power. 
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By investing immediately in energy efficiency and demand management, the NSW 
Government could delay major spending on baseload power, giving more time for the 
development of low-emission baseload technologies. A final point to note is that the 
investments discussed here are all dwarfed by the costs that will be imposed on the NSW 
economy if we do not act to avoid dangerous climate change. As the Stern Review (Stern 
2006) showed, the cost of climate change will be far greater than the cost of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and costs increase the longer we delay. 
3.5 Private or public investment 
The Owen Inquiry considered the costs and benefits of private versus public sector 
investment in the NSW electricity industry to fund changes to the structure of the State-
owned retailers, new baseload power stations and possible carbon reduction technologies. It 
found that private investment would be preferable. The sections below consider the 
arguments for private versus public sector investment. 
3.5.1 Impact on State  finances 
The central argument raised by the Owen Report in support of private sector investment is 
the impact on State finances of continued public sector investment in the NSW electricity 
industry. The Owen Report argues that: ‘The current arrangement in New South Wales will 
ultimately lead to Government funding nearly all, if not all, investment in the State’s 
electricity industry over the next 10 to 15 years’ (Owen 2007, p.iv). Using its estimate of the 
required scale of investment, the Owen Report goes on to examine the impact of such an 
investment on State finances. It finds that: 
additional debt funding, particularly for investment in assets that rely on market-determined 
revenues, may have an adverse impact on the State’s AAA credit rating (Owen 2007, p.iv). 
Further: 
The combined impact of both the divestment of generation and retail and the avoidance of 
new generation investment means that total State net debt would be up to $26 billion lower in 
2020 compared to a ‘retain and invest’ scenario. This would significantly improve the State’s 
fiscal position and the Government’s ability to meet its State Plan objectives (Owen 2007, p.1-
13). 
This estimate of the impact on State finances includes an estimate of $10 billion in proceeds 
from the sale of the generation and retail assets. It is worth noting that the possible price 
received is far from certain – Debnam (2007) considers that the likely range is between $4 
billion and $15 billion. The Owen Report makes no attempt to consider how variation in the 
sale price would affect the case for privatisation. Section 4.5 considers this issue in more 
detail. 
There are several problems with these estimates. First, it is by no means clear that the current 
arrangements would lead to the State delivering all investment in the NSW electricity 
industry over the next 10 to 15 years. Section 3.6 demonstrates that private sector 
participation can occur despite government retention of the State-owned generators and 
retailers as long as various conditions for private sector investment are met. Steps that the 
NSW Government would need to take to encourage investment without privatising its assets 
are outlined in Sections 3.6. 
Second, as shown in Section 3.4, the Owen Report’s estimates of the scale of investment 
required are unjustifiably high. Even if the NSW Government had to fund the entire 
investment, the impact on State finances of the more moderate investment path discussed in 
Section 3.4 would be much less problematic. With investment in energy efficiency to reduce 
the ongoing cost of network augmentation, the impact on State debt could be even further 
reduced. 
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Third, any investment in the electricity sector, whether by private or public interests, will 
earn a rate of return. According to Robins (2007): ‘Since the Labor Government was elected 
in 1995 it has banked more than $11 billion in returns from the electricity sector’. In the 
financial year to 30 June 2006, the State-owned electricity businesses provided distributions 
to government (tax and dividends) totalling $1.1 billion (Auditor-General 2006). This 
comprised: 
• $211.2 million from Macquarie Generation 
• $201.9 million from Delta Electricity 
• $97 million from Eraring Energy 
• $304 million from EnergyAustralia 
• $169.1 million from Integral Energy 
• $158.5 million from Country Energy. 
Of this $1.1 billion, $689 million was paid in the form of dividends. The portion of this 
income flowing from the generators and the retail components of the combined retail and 
distribution businesses would be lost if the State-owned businesses were sold. 
In addition to the revenue transferred directly to the NSW Government, the State-owned 
businesses have also increased their own value through profits. Thus, the best measure of the 
value that would be lost is the after-tax profit of each business. The after-tax profit for these 
businesses amounted to $1,057 million in 2006 (Auditor-General 2006). Some of this value 
would be retained via the distribution arms of the combined retail and distribution 
businesses. It is not clear how much of the profit is made by the retail arms and how much 
by the distribution arms. According to the Owen Report, around 10 per cent of the 
operations and staff are retail-related (Owen 2007, p.7-21) so a reasonable assumption is that 
10% of the profit is retail-related. On this basis, $543 million per year would be lost through 
sale of the assets.  
The question that needs to be asked is whether the benefits from selling public assets and 
foregoing this revenue outweigh this lost revenue. The proceeds from sale of the State-
owned generation and retail businesses could be used to reduce debt and reduce interest 
payments from service of this debt. In addition, the NSW Government could avoid further 
investment in the electricity industry, which would prevent it from taking on higher debt 
levels in the future. However, as we saw in Section 2, it is uncertain whether privatisation 
can really be considered a successful method of improving public finances. Quiggin’s 
analysis of the Victorian and South Australian cases showed that the fiscal impact on the 
public sector was either negative or more or less neutral (Quiggin 2002; 2001). Some NSW-
specific analysis is appropriate. 
The price that would be paid for the State-owned generators and retailers is speculative. 
However, assuming a price of $10 billion (as mentioned in the Owen Report), and that the 
NSW Government could immediately retire this amount of debt, the reduction in interest 
payments would be $620 million per year at the NSW Treasury Bond Rate of 6.2%. This 
represents a net benefit of $77 million per year. 
Additional savings would be possible through avoidance of future investment, amounting to 
another $248 million per year (on $4 billion of avoided investment). However, additional 
investments in the generation and retail businesses would be expected to earn a rate of 
return that should at least cover any additional interest payments incurred due to that 
investment. In other words, future dividends would be higher due to the increased and more 
competitive scale of the businesses. Debt, in itself, is not necessarily a bad thing (Walker and 
Walker, 2000). It is an enabling mechanism that can support greater earnings. 
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It seems, therefore, that the net benefit of privatisation to the State’s finances is only $77 
million per year when assumptions are used that are more reasonable than those used in the 
Owen Report. Further, this estimate is highly dependent on the sale price. If the sale price 
fell to $8.8 billion, the net benefit to the State’s finances would be zero. Given the many risks 
involved with privatisation, the benefits appear minimal. 
The other key issue considered in the Owen Report with respect to State finances, flowing 
from the Terms of Reference, is whether a higher level of debt resulting from electricity 
sector investment would threaten the State’s AAA credit rating. This is much less likely 
under the more reasonable investment path considered in Section 3.4. Further, a net benefit 
of $77 million per year would make little difference to the result. 
In fact, as Beder (2007) discusses, ‘ratings agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s recognise that 
state governments have an obligation to fund infrastructure development and that this may 
be through debt’ (Beder 2007, p. 10). Ratings agencies would be more interested in how the 
debt is managed, what it is used for and the level of risk involved (Beder 2007). In 
determining a government’s credit rating, Standard & Poors for example, ‘view the debt 
burden in the context of an LRG’s [local or regional government’s] ability to maintain certain 
amounts of debt obligations’ (Kochanov and Dimitrijevic 2007, p. 17; Beder 2007). 
In the unlikely event that the State’s credit rating was downgraded, would this be a 
disastrous event? In 1999-2000, the negative impact of a fall in the NSW credit rating of one 
level would have been only $30 million per annum (Walker and Walker 2000). Selling off the 
State-owned generation and retail businesses may reduce short-term budget pressure 
slightly but this is likely to be at the expense of long-term value. 
In summary, it is true that significant investment would be required to maintain the viability 
of the State-owned businesses. Further, electricity generation is a risky business where 
ongoing returns are not guaranteed. However, the positive impact of privatisation on State 
finances has been grossly overstated. 
3.5.2 Consumer impacts 
Another important consideration is whether consumers would be better or worse off under 
private ownership. A key issue here is the cost of capital to the public and private sectors. 
Several authors argue, convincingly, that the cost of capital to governments is lower than the 
private cost of capital (Quiggin 1997; Thomas 2007; Walker and Walker 2000). As a result, it 
is cheaper for the public sector to fund the necessary investment in the NSW electricity sector 
and these savings could be passed on to consumers. 
Critics of this argument contend that the risks are the same for public or private sector 
finance, but that taxpayers implicitly bear the additional risk under public sector financing 
arrangements (Webb and Pulle 2002). While this is an interesting theoretical argument, it 
does not change the fact that governments can borrow money at a cheaper rate than the 
private sector. For consumers, it is this reality that matters. There is little doubt that there is 
an inherent consumer benefit in retaining public ownership of electricity assets due to the 
lower cost of capital to governments. 
The Owen Report does not discuss the cost of capital. This is a serious failing, as the assumed 
cost of capital critically determines whether a proposed privatisation will be assessed as 
having a positive or negative economic impact (Walker and Walker 2000). 
While, on one hand, the cost of capital creates an inherent benefit for government ownership, 
on the other hand it is often argued that the private sector operates more efficiently than the 
public sector and can therefore deliver the same level of service at lower cost or greater 
profit. If the benefit of higher private efficiency outweighs the benefit of government’s lower 
cost of capital, then privatisation may deliver a net benefit to consumers. Again, the Owen 
Report fails to analyse this issue. However, in an era when State-owned corporations are 
operating in a competitive market, there is little reason to believe the State-owned 
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corporations are operating less efficiently than the private sector would. State-owned 
corporations have been forced to increase their productivity to maintain their competitive 
position in a contestable market. There is no inherent reason why a State-owned corporation 
is unable to operate as efficiently as a private competitor and the Owen Report provides no 
evidence that this is the case. On balance, we believe there is an inherent consumer benefit in 
retaining public ownership. 
There is also a more practical concern associated with private ownership, which is the 
potential for consolidation of market power in the hands of a small number of players. If the 
market is not sufficiently competitive, then private operators may be able to raise prices 
relatively easily, with negative impacts on consumers. As discussed in Section 2, and as has 
been documented extensively by the UK electricity and gas watchdog Energywatch, this 
situation has occurred in the UK electricity market which is now dominated by the ‘Big Six’ 
energy suppliers, with resulting negative consequences for UK electricity consumers. The 
likelihood of this outcome appears to be different for the generation and retail businesses. 
Generators sell the electricity they generate through the NEM, which is a competitive market 
that is generally working well. There are numerous generators bidding into this market and 
the lowest cost bids are accepted by NEMMCO. There appears to be little scope for 
generators to raise prices unless the market as a whole is doing so. Of course, this could 
change with greater market concentration, which could follow from a sale of the State-
owned generation assets. 
The situation is somewhat different in retail, where competition in the residential market 
remains uneven. By 2005-06, 42% of customers in EnergyAustralia’s standard supply area 
had taken up negotiated contracts, compared to 28.8% in Integral Energy’s area and only 
4.6% in Country Energy’s area (IPART 2007). The majority of customers in NSW had chosen 
to stay on regulated retail tariffs. While there is a growth trend in the uptake of negotiated 
contracts and IPART has taken steps in its latest retail pricing determination to encourage 
competition, a competitive retail market is still developing in NSW. The Australian Energy 
Market Commission is due to undertake a review of the effectiveness of retail competition in 
NSW in 2009. In advance of this review, it would be risky to assume that the retail market in 
NSW is sufficiently competitive to prevent private operators from exercising market power. 
The experience in the UK is cautionary. There, market concentration and integration since 
the introduction of full competition has acted as a barrier to real competition, and consumers 
have seen significant recent price rises (Energywatch 2007b). Many residential customers, 
particularly low-income and disadvantaged customers, have little real choice of market 
contracts. In NSW, the retailers have tended to market to the most profitable customers and 
ignore the rest. With all retail concentrated in private hands, the risk of significant price rises 
for at least some residential customers is very real. 
If the State-owned generation and retail businesses are sold, strong customer protection 
measures will be needed to prevent negative impacts on consumers. 
3.5.3 Discussion 
In relation to public versus private investment, the Owen Report concluded as follows: 
I conclude that Government funding, in place of private sector funding, is not essential to 
allow Government to ensure security of supply or achieve appropriate price, social or 
environmental outcomes from the State’s electricity industry (Owen 2007, p.v). 
While we concur with this finding, it needs to be qualified. First, the impact on the State’s 
finances of retaining public ownership of the State-owned energy businesses is seriously 
overstated in the Owen Report. This greatly reduces the incentive to privatise. It is far from 
clear that there would be a net benefit to State finances, and any benefit would be much less 
than the Owen Report claims. 
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Second, there appears to be an inherent economic benefit from retaining public ownership 
due to the lower cost of capital for governments. The Owen Report fails to examine or 
quantify this benefit. 
Third, private sector ownership is only appropriate when sufficient mechanisms are in place 
to protect customers and the environment. Continued government ownership may be 
preferable when competitive markets have not yet developed, as is the case for the 
residential retail market and the emissions trading market. There is a strong case for 
delaying privatisation of at least the State-owned retail businesses until the AEMC completes 
its review of the effectiveness of retail competition in NSW in 2009, at which time the 
parameters of a future emissions trading market will also be clearer. 
Finally, it is important to consider how risk is managed under public and private ownership. 
While it is often argued that privatisation transfers commercial risks associated with 
electricity provision in a competitive market to the private sector, it only does so to a limited 
degree. As noted by McDonell (2004, p.84): 
Governments are confronted with ‘”the sovereign risk of universal service” of electricity, that 
is, the de facto residual and in-eradicable risk attendant upon a government’s obligation in a 
modern society to assure the supply of electricity to all, households and businesses alike, as an 
essential service. 
In other words, the public sector will always retain the risk associated with the need to 
provide an essential service. If private firms collapse, the NSW Government will be left to 
pick up the pieces at taxpayer expense, as has been the case in the UK (Thomas 2007). There 
is no consideration of this risk in the Owen Report. 
3.6 Private sector participation 
Having determined that private sector investment in the NSW electricity industry is 
preferable to ongoing public sector investment, the Owen Report goes on to consider ways to 
secure private sector investment. According to the Owen Report: 
Submissions to the Inquiry from those parties likely to invest in generation, are confident that 
the private sector will invest in generation capacity when a demonstrable market need 
reflected in wholesale electricity prices is predicted, and an investment case can be made for 
commercially viable operation and financing (Owen 2007, p.7-3). 
The Owen Report then goes on to explore the conditions for private sector investment in 
more detail. These can be summarised as follows: 
• Investors need access to a stable revenue stream 
• Investors need access to suitable sites 
• Investors need access to competitively priced fuel 
• Investors need to be able to obtain sufficient revenue, via retail tariffs 
• The impediment of government ownership needs to be removed 
• The impediment of carbon uncertainty needs to be removed. 
The Owen Report concludes that the best way to meet these conditions and encourage 
private sector investment is to sell the State-owned generation and retail businesses. Each of 
the conditions and the final argument for privatisation are considered below. 
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3.6.1 A stable  revenue stream 
Investors in the electricity industry need access to a stable revenue stream (Owen 2007, p.7-
6). Electricity industry participants have developed several business models to provide 
revenue stability, including fully contracting a power station’s future output, vertical 
integration of generation and retail assets, and development of generation portfolios. Where 
there has been investment in new generation capacity in the NEM it has usually been 
consistent with one of these models. 
The Owen Report goes on to argue that: 
Selling the State’s retail operations would increase the private sector’s commercial exposure to 
the retail load in New South Wales and facilitate businesses adopting a vertical integration 
approach to underwrite investment in generation capacity in the State (Owen 2007, p.7-19). 
This is true; however, it is by no means the only way to facilitate further investment in 
generation in NSW under a suitable business model. One alternative is for the NSW 
Government to pursue vertical integration by merging State-owned generation businesses 
with State-owned retail businesses. These more competitive State-owned generation and 
retail businesses could then compete with private operators to deliver generation in response 
to price signals in the NEM. A second alternative is for the private sector to invest in new 
generation as part of a generation portfolio approach, avoiding the need to purchase a retail 
operation. A third alternative is for the private sector to develop new generation and fully 
contract the future power station output. This could be particularly attractive for developers 
of renewable energy. 
With these other options available, privatisation is not necessary to provide public or private 
investors with a stable revenue stream. 
3.6.2 Access to suitable sites 
Investors also need access to suitable sites. At present, government businesses ‘own some of 
the most suitable and progressed generation development sites in the State’ (Owen 2007, p.7-
8). These sites have favourable access to ‘fuel, water supply and transmission infrastructure’ 
and are ‘considerably progressed in the project feasibility and development approval stages’ 
(Owen 2007, p.7-9). Again, privatisation of the State-owned generation and retail businesses 
is not necessary to provide access to these sites. Suitable development sites could be leased 
or sold to private investors while retaining public ownership of existing generation assets.  
It is also worth noting that suitable sites for development of renewable energy may be quite 
different to sites that are suitable for coal-fired and gas-fired power stations. For example, 
wind farms often occupy rural land that can be retained by the owners – the wind farm 
operators pay the landowner a fee for siting their wind turbines on the land. With a greater 
focus on renewable energy, there would be no shortage of suitable development sites for the 
private sector. 
3.6.3 Access to competitively priced fuel 
In addition, investors need access to competitively priced fuel. It is for this reason that the 
Inquiry recommends not prohibiting or favouring any particular fuel, as this could weaken 
competition between fuels and lead to higher prices. Owen (2007, p.7-10) argues that 
emissions trading should be used to let the market achieve environmental outcomes without 
specifically favouring any fuel. This approach seems reasonable as long as the emission 
reduction targets in any emissions trading regime are adequate to achieve environmental 
objectives. The danger is that a new coal-fired power station, without carbon capture and 
storage, will achieve concessions from government to reduce its exposure to future emissions 
trading and limit investment risk. Regardless, there is no evidence that privatisation would 
have any influence on access to competitively priced fuel. Other factors are much more 
influential. 
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The Inquiry also recommends further streamlining of planning approval processes for power 
station development. Recent reforms under Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act 1979 have been criticised by the Environmental Defender’s Office NSW: 
In effect, Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979…dramatically 
reduces the involvement of the community in the original decision making process and seeks 
to reduce any risk of concerned individuals or groups delaying or preventing significant 
development, by limiting the grounds on which, or the circumstances in which, they can seek 
merits or judicial review. Instead, the Minister for Planning and Director General, Department 
of Planning maintain the power to make all key decisions regarding significant development, 
with advice from ‘expert panels', limited input from other key agencies and little opportunity 
for effective criticism where the bureaucracy ‘gets it wrong' (Ratcliff, Wood & Higginson 
2007). 
In the interest of streamlining planning approvals, the community has been effectively 
sidelined. Further streamlining is not in the public interest. It is also worth noting here that 
any new coal-fired power station would inevitably be subject to protests and court 
challenges, as has been the case for all recent coal-related developments in Australia. This 
would further slow approval processes and makes investment in coal without carbon 
capture and storage a risky proposition. 
3.6.4 Retail pricing 
According to the Owen Report, investors need to be able to obtain sufficient revenue, which 
ultimately comes from retail tariffs. Where tariffs are set ‘below the full cost of generating, 
transmitting and distributing electricity, and providing retail services to customers’ there is 
little incentive to invest (Owen 2007, p.7-13). This situation no longer exists in NSW – the 
recent IPART (2007) determination on retail prices effectively increased prices to above the 
level of efficient costs for the three incumbent retailers as a way of stimulating retail 
competition (IPART 2007, pp.5-6). The regulated retail tariff now exceeds the actual cost of 
electricity supply for the incumbent retailers. 
3.6.5 Impact of  government ownership 
The Owen Report notes that: 
The NSW Government is both policy-maker and owner of electricity businesses. This position 
creates a perception of a conflict for the Government…The conflict arises with the perception 
that an effective, although not the most prudent, way to keep the lights on is for the 
Government as owner to build (Owen 2007, p.7-14). 
The essential argument here is that private sector investment is deterred because of fears that 
investment will be stranded by government investments made to address perceived energy 
security problems. 
Several observations can be made here. First, as noted by the Inquiry, ‘this perception has 
not stopped the private sector investors in both Tallawarra and Uranquinty’, despite Delta 
Electricity’s investment in Colongra (Owen 2007, p.7-14). The Inquiry goes on to state that: 
The Inquiry has not been presented with any evidence of non-commercial investment and 
other market behaviour by the SOCs. Assertions are not well founded and the Inquiry notes in 
particular that the bidding behaviour of a public sector business is subject to the same 
regulation as bidding by the private sector. Investment decisions must meet the same sort of 
rate of return criteria that are sought in the private sector (Owen 2007, p.7-16). 
In other words, if the private sector perceives that its investment will be stranded by poor 
government investment decisions, there does not appear to be any basis for this perception 
in fact.  
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Second, with appropriate separation of policy and commercial functions, the State-owned 
businesses are simply competitors with the private businesses. Like other competitors, they 
are under no obligation to reveal their capabilities or intentions to competitors to help them 
avoid the risk of a stranded asset. If the private sector is able to deliver generation capacity at 
a lower cost than the State-owned businesses then its investment will not be stranded. On 
the other hand, if the State-owned businesses are inherently able to deliver cheaper 
generation than private operators, then this merely strengthens the argument for continued 
public ownership. 
Third, the Inquiry argues that the government can remove these private sector perceptions 
by making ‘a credible commitment not to invest further in generation’ (Owen 2007, p.7-15). If 
the government did wish to encourage private investment, it could make such a commitment 
without needing to sell its existing assets. For example, it could release a policy including a 
clear commitment to leave the private sector to invest in generation but setting a minimum 
projected reserve capacity level that would trigger emergency government investment to 
maintain energy security. This would provide clear parameters for private sector investment 
while ensuring energy security. 
3.6.6 Carbon risk 
According to the Owen Report: ‘Submissions to the Inquiry are unanimous that investment 
in baseload generation will be delayed by uncertainty around a national emissions trading 
scheme’ (Owen 2007, p.7-16). Further: 
Without a timely resolution, the next tranche of significant investment in generation in New 
South Wales and the broader NEM will be made without an informed view of the future costs 
and regime for carbon. Under this scenario, it is unlikely the market will get the mix of 
generation technology right and ensure the most efficient market outcome (Owen 2007, p.7-
16). 
Under an Australian Labor Government, emissions trading is due to commence by 2010. 
Short-term targets are unlikely to be announced until the report of the Garnaut Review in 
mid-2008. Under a Coalition Government, emissions trading is due to commence no later 
than 2012; key elements of scheme design would not be determined until mid-2008. 
Whatever the result of the Federal election, the precise nature of a future emissions trading 
scheme is unlikely to become clear until well into 2008. There is very little the NSW 
Government can do to influence this situation. 
The uncertainty created by this situation is an excellent reason to delay a decision on 
privatisation until more information is available. Fortunately, as discussed in Section 3.2, 
there is sufficient time available to wait for the structure of the carbon market to become 
clearer. In the meantime, the NSW Government could readily invest in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, which will certainly not be disadvantaged by a future carbon price. 
One of the biggest risks associated with moving quickly to privatise generation assets is that 
the private sector could require governments to provide guarantees that any new investment 
in generation will not be exposed to a future carbon price. This could amount to a very 
substantial subsidy over time. The NSW Government has already shown its willingness to 
sign agreements of this type, having provided BlueScope Steel with a range of guarantees 
relating to future exposure to carbon prices in response for investment (NSW Government 
and BlueScope Steel, 2006). 
3.6.7 Sale of retail businesses 
Having considered the conditions for private sector investment, the Owen Report 
recommends that ‘the NSW Government should transfer its retail and generation interests to 
the private sector’ (Owen 2007, p.7-1). The rationale for sale of the State-owned retail 
businesses is considered below. 
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The Owen Report argues that: 
Selling the State’s retail operations would increase the private sector’s commercial exposure to 
the retail load in New South Wales and facilitate businesses adopting a vertical integration 
approach to underwrite investment in generation capacity in the state. Businesses that are 
exposed to a critical mass of retail load would have strong incentives to invest in new 
generation as part of their overall risk management strategy (Owen 2007, p.7-19). 
This is certainly one option for stimulating private sector investment in baseload generation 
in NSW but it is not the only option. As discussed in Section 3.6.1, there are other investment 
models that provide a stable revenue stream without requiring the sale of the State-owned 
retail businesses. Investors could adopt a generation portfolio model or a forward contract 
model. 
The Inquiry argues that the incentives to invest will be strongest when there is diversity of 
generation investment business models, however no evidence is presented for this assertion. 
Even if this is true, there is nothing preventing the private sector from pursuing a vertical 
integration model, albeit more slowly. By providing an attractive retail offer that lures 
customers from the incumbent retailers, private retailers could increase their retail exposure 
over time.  
Given that sale of the State-owned retailers is not necessary to stimulate private investment, 
are there other benefits that make it an attractive prospect? The primary benefit identified by 
the Inquiry is the realisation of the current market value of the retailers and use of the equity 
to strengthen the State’s fiscal position (Owen 2007, p.7-26). A closely related benefit is 
avoidance of the need to invest in the State-owned retailers to maintain their viability. This, 
when it comes down to it, is the real driver behind the push for privatisation – a short-term 
desire to reduce State debt by cashing in these valuable businesses. As shown in Section 
3.5.1, the net benefit to State finances would actually be minimal. 
Another argument in support of sale of the retailers is that ‘the value of the SOC retailers will 
decline over time (without significant equity injections and permission to aggressively grow 
the businesses) and the State will be potentially required to write down the value of these 
assets on the State’s balance sheet’ (Owen 2007, p.7-25). If the State-owned retailers were to 
retain their current business model, this is probably an accurate assessment. However, there 
is a great opportunity to reinvigorate the State-owned retailers by transforming them into 
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) focused on the delivery of efficient energy services 
(Outhred and MacGill 2006). These ESCOs could deliver energy efficiency measures under a 
new business model that does not try to directly compete with vertically integrated 
companies. This possibility is examined in more detail in Section 5.2.4. 
Even if the retailers retain their existing business model and their value declines over time, it 
may be in the best interests of the public to retain these businesses. As Thomas (2007, p.8) 
points out: 
The value of the government’s businesses is only of interest if the government proposes to sell 
them. If it is not going to privatise them, their value is irrelevant. It is possible that measures 
that would maintain the value of these businesses may be detrimental to the New South 
Wales public, if, for example, the price of electricity is forced up, or the reliability of electricity 
supplies is adversely affected. 
The potential costs of privatising the State-owned retailers are many. First, there is the loss of 
cash flow from dividends. Second, given that the residential retail market does not yet 
appear to provide effective competition, there is a risk that the new private owners will be 
able to exercise market power to raise prices. Likely buyers include AGL and Origin Energy, 
which are already the largest retailers in the NEM. Third, the government’s lower cost of 
capital means that it could more cost-effectively invest in repositioning the State-owned 
retailers than the private sector. Fourth, the NSW Government would lose a key interface 
with electricity customers that could be used to deliver efficient energy services, perhaps 
using an ESCO model (see Section 5.2.4). Finally, there would be a need to design new 
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customer protection measures, for example to replace the existing Retailer of Last Resort 
(ROLR) arrangements. 
None of these costs are given adequate attention in the Owen Report. When they are taken 
into account, the case for privatisation of the State-owned retailers becomes highly 
questionable. Alternatives to sale of the State-owned retailers are considered in Section 4. 
3.6.8 Sale of generation 
Likewise, it is not necessary for the NSW Government to sell its generation assets to 
encourage further investment in generation. The private sector can readily invest in new 
generation using a portfolio or forward contract model, regardless of whether the generation 
assets are privatised. Sale of generation sites may be necessary but this does not prevent 
retention of existing assets. 
However, the case for retaining the generation assets is not as clear-cut as for the retailers. 
There are several important benefits to privatising the generation assets and fewer costs. In 
addition to the short-term benefit to the State’s finances, sale of the generation assets would 
send a very clear signal that the government is relying on the private sector to invest in 
future baseload power stations. As the generators do not have a direct interface with 
residential customers, there are fewer concerns about customer protection. In addition, the 
competitive nature of the NEM greatly reduces the potential for the new private owners to 
unreasonably raise prices. 
There is a more philosophical issue to consider as well: is it appropriate for a government 
that claims to be a leader in climate change response to continue to own greenhouse 
intensive coal-fired power stations? With a true separation of policy and generation 
functions, the NSW Government may be more able to regulate against greenhouse gas 
emissions without concerns about the impact on its own businesses. 
On the other hand, there would still be costs associated with the loss of dividends and the 
higher cost of capital for the private sector. In addition, the NSW Government will lose some 
of its ability to easily invest in low-emission generation technologies. With direct control of 
the NSW coal-fired generators, the NSW Government would have greater control to 
implement carbon capture and storage, for example. Outhred (2007) argues that the urgency 
of climate change response is such that the NSW Government should retain the assets at least 
until a suitable response has been developed. 
Perhaps the biggest concern associated with sale of the generation assets is the potential for 
delivery of concessions or subsidies to purchasers during the sale process, as discussed in 
Section 3.6.6. If the NSW Government does decide to sell its generation assets, it should 
avoid providing any guarantees to potential purchasers about their future treatment under 
emissions trading or any other climate change response policies. 
On balance, the case for privatising the generators, while stronger than the case for 
privatising the retailers, is not sufficiently strong to allay concerns about negative impacts on 
consumers and the environment. 
3.7 Discussion 
The critical review of the Owen Report presented in this section demonstrates that the case 
for privatisation of the electricity generation and retail assets owned by the NSW 
Government is seriously overstated. The key problems with the case presented in the Owen 
Report are as follows: 
• The electricity demand projections used by the Inquiry fail to adequately account for 
the impact of existing energy efficiency measures, particularly the measures 
introduced in recent years. Further, there is no consideration of the potential impact 
of stronger energy efficiency measures as an alternative to new baseload. 
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• The electricity supply projections have already been overtaken by events with the 
announcement of the proposed Silverton Wind Farm and the new Federal Labor 
Government’s promise to increase the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target to 20% 
by 2020 
• As a result, it is very unlikely that new baseload power will be required as early as 
2013-14. Indeed, NEMMCO’s 2007 Statement of Opportunities (NEMMCO 2007) 
recognises this, identifying a shortfall of only 134MW in 2013-14 compared to the 
327MW deficit in 2010-11 that it had identified in its 2006 Statement of Opportunities 
(NEMMCO 2006). 
• The Owen Report fails to give due consideration to the urgency of climate change 
response in its consideration of options for ensuring future energy security 
• The scale of investment required if the NSW Government retains its existing 
electricity assets is greatly overstated 
• The positive impact of privatisation on State finances is much less than is claimed and 
there appear to be inherent economic benefits associated with State ownership. Even 
the unlikely worst-case scenario of a downgrading of the State’s credit rating would 
have minimal economic impact. 
• Privatisation is not necessary to encourage private sector investment in the electricity 
sector. Alternative options are available in which the State retains some or all of its 
existing electricity assets. 
• Many of the issues raised above are either ignored by the Owen Report or given 
inadequate attention. 
In the next section, we outline some alternative scenarios that seeks to address many of the 
criticisms above while meeting the objective of “keeping the lights on”. 
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4  Alternative scenarios for the NSW electric ity 
industry 
Decision-making processes need to be supported by high-quality independent analysis that 
deals appropriately with uncertainty. In the Owen Report, the choice of assumptions used to 
deal with uncertainty almost invariably strengthened the case for privatisation. As shown 
throughout Section 3, it is possible to identify alternative assumptions that have equal or 
greater support but do not contribute to the case for privatisation. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the desired outcome of the Inquiry had been determined in advance and the 
analysis was shaped to fit that outcome. 
A more appropriate way to deal with future uncertainty is to establish multiple scenarios 
that map out a plausible future territory and to examine differing assumptions that flow 
from these scenarios. In the case of the Owen Inquiry, this might have prompted a more 
adequate consideration of the impact of existing energy efficiency measures and possible 
future measures. It might also have drawn attention to the urgent need for climate change 
response. The Energy Futures Forum developed a series of energy scenarios for Australia 
that could have been used as a foundation for a detailed scenario-based approach (CSIRO 
2006). 
We have undertaken a basic scenario analysis to demonstrate the kind of results that emerge. 
We developed the following four alternative scenarios for the future of the NSW electricity 
industry: 
• Owen Inquiry Proposal: A scenario based directly on the analysis and 
recommendations of the Owen Inquiry.  
• Revised Owen: A scenario in which several of the key assumptions of the Owen 
Inquiry are revised based on the findings of the critical review in Section 3. We 
believe this scenario is much more plausible than the Owen Inquiry scenario. 
• Strong Climate Change Response (private): A scenario in which there is a strong 
government and business response to climate change, with the private sector taking 
the lead after privatisation of electricity assets 
• Strong Climate Change Response (public): A scenario in which there is a strong 
government and business response to climate change, with the NSW Government 
taking the lead after retaining electricity assets. 
The four scenarios are summarised in Table 2. Sections 4.1 to 4.7 define the key elements of 
each scenario. 
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14% increase  8% increase 3% reduction 3% reduction 
Table 2:  Summary of scenarios. 
4.1 Energy demand 
One of the clearest failings of the Owen Report is that existing energy efficiency measures are 
not adequately accounted for in demand projections and the potential for a suite of 
additional energy efficiency measures to deliver the equivalent of a baseload power station is 
not analysed. Clearly, it is more difficult to model the combined impact of a diverse set of 
energy efficiency measures than it is to model the impact of a single power station. 
Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates that energy efficiency is the most cost-effective 
way to ensure that demand does not outstrip supply, while achieving substantial greenhouse 
                                                      
4 NPV = net present value. This is the discounted present value of future cash flows used to compare 
the commercial merit of alternative scenarios. In this case, we have used a discount rate of 12%, which 
is typical for investment decisions. 
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benefits (IPCC 2007; McKinsey Global Institute 2007; MMA 2004; The Allen Consulting 
Group 2004; The Climate Institute 2007). 
Strong pursuit of energy efficiency, facilitated by the NSW Government, would be the 
cornerstone of an alternative approach. At worst, it will buy time before a new baseload 
power station is needed, allowing a more measured approach without the urgency 
recommended by the Owen Report. At best, it could buy sufficient time to ensure that the 
next major power station built in NSW is a low-emission power station. 
Section 4.6 of the Owen Report collects together a list of energy efficiency options for the 
NSW Government to consider as part of its ongoing policy development process (Owen 
2007, p.4-20). The options cover pricing issues, energy efficiency in homes, energy efficiency 
in commercial buildings, energy efficiency of appliances, industrial energy efficiency and 
energy efficiency trading. It is disappointing that the opportunity to model and evaluate the 
impact of these options was missed. For the NSW Government, evaluating the impact of 
these energy efficiency options on future demand and greenhouse gas emissions, and 
identifying ways to implement them, should be a higher priority than pursuit of 
privatisation. 
It is not the purpose of this report to provide a detailed evaluation of the potential of specific 
energy efficiency measures. However, to identify plausible energy demand scenarios, we 
have undertaken review and analysis of the potential of energy efficiency in NSW. 
4.1.1 Owen Inquiry assumptions 
The Owen Inquiry assumes growth in electricity consumption from 79,730 GWh in 2007-08 
to 92,450 GWh by 2016-17, following TransGrid’s medium growth scenario. 
4.1.2 Revised Owen assumptions 
Section 3.2.1 argued that the Owen Report failed to adequately consider the impact of 
existing energy efficiency measures on future demand, particularly those measures 
introduced during or after 2005-06. The impact of these measures is explicitly included under 
the Revised Owen scenario. Some of the significant measures that need to be accounted for 
include: 
• Increase and expansion of BASIX energy targets (NSW) 
• The Energy Savings Fund (NSW) 
• The Climate Change Fund (NSW) 
• Energy Savings Action Plans (NSW) 
• The Energy Efficiency Opportunities program (Australia-wide) 
• Other National Framework for Energy Efficiency measures (Australia-wide). 
None of these existing measures would have achieved discernible savings prior to 2005-06 so 
their impact is ignored in the Owen Report. 
Some data is publicly available on the savings achieved by the Energy Savings Fund. In 
Rounds 1 and 2 and the Public Facilities Program, the Energy Savings Fund provided $29.5 
million to projects that are expected to deliver electricity savings of 144 GWh per year (DEUS 
2007). According to the Department of Environment and Climate Change, $194 million has 
been allocated through the Energy and Water Savings Funds since 2005. Assuming that half 
is allocated to the Energy Savings Fund, and that this investment earns the same savings 
return as the projects identified above, the Fund will deliver energy savings of 473 GWh per 
year. 
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The Energy Savings Fund has now been incorporated into the NSW Climate Change Fund, 
which provides an additional $340 million in funding, including: 
• $100 million Residential Rebate Program providing rebates for hot water systems, 
insulation and rainwater tanks  
• $30 million NSW Green Business Program  
• $30 million Public Facilities program  
• $100 million Recycling and Stormwater Harvesting Program  
• $40 million Renewable Energy Development Fund  
• $20 million School Energy Efficiency program  
• $20 million Rainwater Tanks in Schools program. 
The Department of Environment and Climate Change (DECC 2007) estimates that the 
programs under the NSW Climate Change Fund will achieve the following savings: 
• Residential solar hot water and insulation rebates – no estimates available 
• NSW Green Business Program – 65 GWh per year 
• Renewable Energy Development Program and Public Facilities Fund – 90 GWh per 
year 
• School Energy Efficiency Program – no estimates available. 
Therefore, the total known savings from the Energy Savings Fund and the Climate Change 
Fund add up to 628 GWh per year. However, this excludes the impact of the residential solar 
hot water and insulation rebates and the School Energy Efficiency Program. 
An analysis of three programs under the National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE) 
– Mandatory Energy Performance Standards, Energy Efficiency Opportunities and 
commercial and residential building code regulation programs – finds a projected 
national saving of 1,167 GWh per year by 2015 at a net GDP benefit of $380 million per 
year (NFEE 2007). NSW consumes 32% of all electricity in Australia, so it is reasonable to 
assume that a similar proportion of these savings would occur in NSW, giving a saving 
of 373 GWh per year. This gives cumulative savings of 1,001 GWh per year when 
combined with the Energy Savings Fund. 
Savings for the other listed programs are difficult to determine without more detailed 
analysis, which is beyond the scope of this report. A plausible assumption for the purpose of 
the Revised Owen Scenario is that the other measures that have not been specifically 
assessed above, including the Energy Savings Plans, BASIX, residential solar hot water and 
insulation rebates and changes to Mandatory Energy Performance Standards under the 
NFEE, will deliver additional savings of 1,000 GWh per year. This would deliver a total 
reduction in electricity demand of 2,000 GWh per year from TransGrid’s medium growth 
scenario by 2016-17. The NSW Government should specifically evaluate the impact of all 
existing energy efficiency measures on electricity demand to determine whether this scenario 
is plausible. 
4.1.3 Strong Climate Change Response assumptions 
Under the two Strong Climate Change Response assumptions, there is stronger pursuit of 
energy efficiency, going well beyond existing measures. To understand how much demand 
could be reduced by 2016-17, we have reviewed several assessments of energy efficiency 
potential in Australia. 
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The National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE) is a package of measures to improve 
energy efficiency in the stationary energy sector, supported by all Australian governments. 
Stage 1 commenced in December 2004 and will run until June 2008; Stage 2 will commence 
on 1 July 2008 (NFEE 2007). Modelling undertaken during the development of the NFEE 
showed that a National Energy Efficiency Target to reduce business as usual electricity 
demand by 1.5% per annum, if ramped up quickly, could deliver national energy savings in 
the order of 22,500 GWh/year by 2016-17 (MMA 2004). If savings in NSW were proportional 
to its share of electricity consumption, this would translate to a saving of around 7,000 
GWh/year. Importantly, this target would deliver national savings of $6.6 billion in net 
present value terms (MMA 2004). 
Focusing on NSW, Diesendorf (2005) estimated that efficient energy use could achieve a 
reduction in NSW electricity consumption of 5,306 GWh per year by 2010 (for programs 
starting from 2005). Savings would increase over time, so a program starting in 2008 could 
deliver greater savings than this by 2016-17. 
In research commissioned by The Climate Institute, Saddler (2007) examines the national 
potential of some specific energy efficiency measures in the residential and commercial 
sectors. In the residential sector, Saddler finds potential savings of 11,000 GWh per year 
focusing on existing buildings alone, for programs implemented over the next 15 years. In 
the commercial sector, Saddler finds potential savings of 19,500 GWh per year in existing 
buildings for programs implemented over the next 15 years. Assuming half of this potential 
is delivered by 2016-17 gives savings of 20,300 GWh per year, of which 6,500 GWh per year 
would be delivered in NSW. This is without considering the impact of additional measures 
for new buildings. 
To realise TransGrid’s low-growth scenario, a reduction in demand of 6,890 GWh per year 
needs to be delivered by 2016-17. The studies cited above demonstrate that this is feasible, 
particularly when the impact of existing measures is added. Realising the potential would 
require strong measures to remove recognised barriers to energy efficiency measures. The 
Strong Climate Change Response scenario assumes strong government action on energy 
efficiency to deliver TransGrid’s low-growth scenario. 
Some specific measures that should be considered include: 
• Working with other Australian governments to establish a National Energy 
Efficiency Target. Senator Lyn Allison of the Australian Democrats introduced a 
private Senator’s bill to the Australian Parliament in 2007 to establish a national 
market driven energy efficiency target. The National Market Driven Energy 
Efficiency Target Bill 2007 proposed to amend the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 
2000 to introduce an energy efficiency trading scheme. This Bill provides an excellent 
foundation for a national energy efficiency target. 
• Phase out the use of electric storage water heaters, replacing them with solar water 
heaters, electric heat pumps and natural gas water heaters. A large portion of 
baseload demand in NSW is artificially created by the practice of running off-peak 
water heaters overnight. According to analysis by the NSW Greens, a rapid phase-out 
of electric off-peak water heaters could save between 1,267MW and 2,189MW of 
overnight demand (Frew 2007). This, in turn, would increase the viability of solar 
technologies (solar thermal and photovoltaics) that provide power during daylight 
hours. 
• Increase the BASIX requirements for high-rise residential buildings to match those for 
low-rise buildings 
• Undertake a major energy efficiency retrofit program for existing buildings, 
including at least solar hot water and insulation, and focusing particularly on low-
income households (for example, all suitable public housing) 
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• Mandate efficiency standards for commercial buildings, such as a 5-star Australian 
Building Greenhouse Rating 
• Provide incentives for the use of cogeneration or trigeneration in residential high-rise 
and commercial buildings. 
One of the failings of the Owen Report is that it did not investigate these and other energy 
efficiency options in detail to identify their potential contribution to greenhouse gas emission 
reduction and baseload deferral. No decision on privatisation should be made until the 
potential of these initiatives is appropriately investigated. 
4.2 Timing of new baseload 
4.2.1 Owen Inquiry assumptions 
The Owen Report assumes that new baseload is required by 2013-14, as this is the point at 
which demand exceeds estimated supply under the TransGrid medium growth scenario. 
4.2.2 Revised Owen assumptions 
Under the Revised Owen scenario, the timing of new baseload investment is unchanged. 
Existing energy efficiency measures slightly reduce demand by 2013-14 but not enough to 
prevent the need for new baseload investment. 
4.2.3 Strong Climate Change Response assumptions 
Under the Strong Climate Change Response scenario, electricity demand follows TransGrid’s 
low growth scenario, which means that additional baseload would not be required until 
2016-17 (as this is the year in which demand exceeds available generation capacity of 85,000 
GWh per year).  
4.3 Scale and type of power station investment 
4.3.1 Owen Inquiry assumptions 
The Owen Report assumes that natural gas will supply intermediate and peaking loads via 
750MW of new open cycle gas turbines and 770MW of new combined cycle gas turbines to 
commence operation between 2009-10 and 2011-12. A new coal-fired power station would 
provide additional baseload, delivering new capacity of 2,000MW between 2012-13 and 
2015-16 (Owen 2007, p.A6-2). The cost of this new generation investment is estimated at $7 
billion to $8 billion. 
4.3.2 Revised Owen assumptions 
Section 3.4 demonstrates that the scale of investment required to meet future demand is 
overestimated in the Owen Report. Under the Revised Owen scenario, future baseload 
requirements are met using combined cycle gas turbines and renewable energy, in 
recognition of the impact of the new Federal Labor Government’s policies to implement 
emissions trading by 2010, achieve a 60% reductions in emissions by 2050 and increase 
renewable generation to 20% by 2020. 
The Labor Government’s 20% MRET will deliver an additional 32,000 GWh per year of 
renewable generation by 2020, based on ABARE (2006) projections. Assuming this is 
delivered in equal annual increments between 2010 and 2020, and that NSW receives a share 
of this new renewable energy proportional to its current share of electricity generation, new 
renewable generation exceeds the TransGrid non-scheduled energy forecasts by 2014-15. 
This means that renewable energy begins to make an additional contribution by 2014-15 that 
reduces the necessary scale of natural gas investment. The additional contribution reaches 
3,200 GWh in 2016-17 and 5,900 GWh by 2019-20. To realise this scenario, the NSW 
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Government may need to take specific steps to ensure that NSW receives a proportional 
share of new renewable investment, or can access it through interconnectors. 
After the impact of existing energy efficiency measures and new renewable generation under 
MRET is considered, the only additional baseload investment required is 385MW of CCGT to 
be delivered by 2013-14 and an additional 385MW of CCGT in 2017-18 (assuming a capacity 
factor of 70% as per the Owen Report. This capacity would deliver 2,400 GWh of additional 
generation by 2016-17 and 4,722 GWh of additional generation by 2019-20, which is sufficient 
to meet identified shortfalls when combined with existing energy efficiency measures and 
new renewable generation under MRET. 
Using the assumptions from Owen (2007, p.A6-5), the cost of this new generation would be 
$393 million in 2013-14 and $385 million in 2017-18, for a total investment of $778 million. No 
additional investment in energy efficiency is required under this scenario. There would be 
additional investment in renewable energy generation in response to MRET, however 
private investors (and ultimately consumers) would pay for this to meet regulatory 
requirements, so there would be no impact on State finances and no need for intervention by 
the NSW Government. 
4.3.3 Strong Climate Change Response assumptions 
Under the Strong Climate Change Response scenario, no additional baseload is required 
until 2016-17 due to the impact of new energy efficiency measures. Further, the new baseload 
requirement is entirely met by new investment in renewable energy under the new Federal 
Labor Government’s expanded MRET scheme through to 2019-20. The combined impact of 
new energy efficiency measures and new renewable generation is to avoid or supply an 
additional 15,600 GWh per year in NSW by 2019-20, which is more than sufficient to prevent 
shortfalls. 
4.4 Cost to the State of continued public ownership 
4.4.1 Owen Inquiry assumptions 
Under the Owen Inquiry scenario, the estimated cost to the State budget of the status quo is 
$12-15 billion. This comprises $7-8 billion for power station investment, $2-3 billion to make 
the State-owned retailers more competitive and $3-4 billion to retrofit coal-fired power 
stations with carbon reduction technologies. The Owen Report assumes that the costs will be 
spread over time so that $750 million is required annually between 2008-09 and 2013-14 and 
$1.5 billion annually between 2014-15 and 2019-20 (Owen 2007, p.A6-10). The net present 
value of this investment is $6.2 billion (at 12% discount rate).5 
4.4.2 Revised Owen assumptions 
Under the Revised Owen scenario, the estimated cost to the State budget of the status quo 
falls to $6-8 billion. The investments in the State-owned retailers and in future carbon 
reduction technologies are unchanged. However, the investment in baseload power falls 
substantially. New CCGT power stations require $778 million. We have allowed another 
$220 million in investment to encourage renewable generation in NSW, to ensure that the 
assumptions about the contribution of renewable energy are achieved. This could be 
delivered as a government subsidy to renewable energy generators in NSW of $21/MWh, 
which should be sufficient to attract significant renewable energy investment to the State. 
This subsidy would be delivered on top of any incentives delivered through an expanded 
MRET and emissions trading. It could be specifically targeted to renewable energy 
generators that would contribute to baseload. The net present value of investment under this 
scenario is $3.4 billion (at 12% discount rate). 
                                                      
5 As noted earlier, a 12% discount rate is a typical rate used to make commercial investment decisions, 
in both the public and private sector. 
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4.4.3 Strong Climate Change Response assumptions 
Under the Strong Climate Change Response scenarios, all future demand is met through 
new energy efficiency measures and new renewable energy delivered under MRET. Section 
4.1.3 indicated that a National Energy Efficiency Target sufficient to ensure that electricity 
demand in NSW follows the TransGrid low growth scenario would have a net economic 
benefit. The Target would not necessarily have any direct impact on public expenditure – 
liable parties would need to invest in energy efficiency to comply with the target but would 
recoup this investment over time. However, in practice, the NSW Government would likely 
provide funding support to assist with implementation of energy efficiency measures. 
As part of the modelling for the NFEE, EMET examined the energy efficiency potential in the 
commercial sub-sectors (EMET 2004a) and residential sector (EMET 2004b). EMET identified 
measures with a total implementation cost of $14.3 billion with payback periods up to six 
years. Assuming the opportunities available in NSW are proportional to its electricity 
consumption, the implementation cost of available measures would be $4.6 billion. A 
reasonable assumption under the Strong Climate Change Response scenarios is that the 
NSW Government would provide funding to support uptake of these opportunities 
amounting to one quarter of this figure, or $1.2 billion. The beneficiaries of these 
opportunities would need to provide the remaining $3.4 billion, which is entirely reasonable 
give that these opportunities have short payback periods. The funding would be spread 
evenly over 12 years and would be prioritised towards measures with longer payback 
periods. 
As with the Revised Owen scenario, we have also assumed $220 million in investment to 
support renewable energy in NSW. The investments in the State-owned retailers and in 
future carbon reduction technologies are unchanged. This gives total investment of $6.4-8.4 
billion, with a net present value of $3.6 billion. 
4.5 Impact on State finances of privatisation 
4.5.1 Owen Inquiry assumptions 
The Owen Report finds that retention of the existing assets would increase State debt by 
$12.8 billion by 2020. It assumes a sale price for the assets of $10 billion. Consequently, if all 
of the sale proceeds were used to retire debt, then State debt in 2020 could be $22.8 billion 
lower as a result of privatisation. 
However, as argued in Section 3.5.1, any additional investment in the electricity sector 
should earn a return that is sufficient to cover the cost of that investment. This is particularly 
likely given the NSW Government’s lower cost of capital compared to its private sector 
competitors. Further, the revenue from sale of the assets needs to be balanced against the loss 
of income from the assets. As shown in Section 3.5.1, the net benefit to State finances under 
the Owen Inquiry scenario is only $77 million per year. 
4.5.2 Revised Owen assumptions 
Under the Revised Owen scenario, the investment required if the existing assets are retained 
is much less - $6-8 billion. Again, this investment should earn a rate of return that at least 
covers the cost of the investment, so the net impact on State finances would be zero (or 
better). The net impact of privatisation therefore depends on the sale price obtained 
compared to the income received from the assets. 
If the assets sold for $4 billion, the reduction in interest payments would be $248 million per 
year (at 6.2 per cent). If the assets sold for $15 billion, the reduction in interest payments 
would be $930 million per year. As the income from the assets is $543 million per year, the 
net impact of privatisation ranges from a negative impact of $295 million per year to a 
positive impact of $387 million per year, depending on the sale price. 
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4.5.3 Strong Climate Change Response assumptions 
The Strong Climate Change Response scenarios make the same assumptions as the Revised 
Owen scenario. 
4.6 Fate of assets 
4.6.1 Owen Inquiry assumptions 
Under the Owen Inquiry scenario, the State’s generation and retail assets are divested. The 
most likely approach is sale of retail assets and a long-term lease of generation assets. 
Although the Owen Report states a preference for sale of generation assets ((Owen 2007, p.7-
9), a long-term lease is more likely to ensure consistency with the Premier’s statement in 
Parliament on 9 May 2007 that ‘there will be no sale of electricity generation, transmission or 
distribution’ (Owen 2007, p.xiii). In other words, the choice of a long-term lease is a political 
choice, rather than an economic one. In practical terms, there will be no difference between 
sale of the assets and a long-term lease.  
4.6.2 Revised Owen assumptions 
Under the Revised Owen scenario, the fate of the assets would depend on negotiations with 
possible purchasers. If the likely sale price were high enough to ensure a positive impact on 
State finances, then privatisation would take place. If not, then the assets would be retained 
in public ownership. However, a key risk with this scenario is that sale of the assets would 
become inevitable once a process of negotiating with buyers commenced, regardless of the 
price obtained. 
4.6.3 Strong Climate Change Response assumptions 
There are two variants on the Strong Climate Change Response scenario. Under one variant, 
the State’s generation and retail assets are divested. This achieves separation of regulation 
and ownership for the generation and retail sectors and potentially allows the NSW 
Government to adopt a strong regulatory approach on climate change without any conflict 
of interest. However, the NSW Government’s retention of transmission and distribution 
businesses will still provide an incentive for greater electricity consumption under existing 
regulatory arrangements, as the profit of these businesses is linked to throughput. 
Under the other variant, the State retains its generation and retail assets and takes a 
leadership role in climate change response as both an owner and regulator. The NSW 
Government would need to act to transform the retail businesses into Energy Service 
Companies (ESCOs) with a strong focus on energy efficiency. It would also need to take 
action to reduce emissions from its coal-fired power stations or develop a plan for their 
retirement. 
4.7 Greenhouse gas emissions 
4.7.1 Owen Inquiry assumptions 
Under the Owen Inquiry scenario, total electricity consumption grows from 79,730 GWh in 
2007-08 to 92,450 GWh in 2016-17, an increase of 12,720 GWh of electricity per year. Using 
current full fuel-cycle emission factors for electricity consumption in NSW (1.068 kg CO2-e 
per kWh from AGO 2006), greenhouse gas emissions in 2007-08 are 85 Mt CO2-e. 
The increase in electricity demand would be met by increased use of existing generators and 
new generation. Existing generators can supply up to 85,100 GWh, providing an additional 
5,370 GWh per year (Owen 2007, p.2-10). Assuming this increased generation has the same 
emissions factor as current generation, the increase in emissions would be 5.7 Mt CO2-e. The 
remaining 7,350 GWh would come from new generation, primarily a 2,000MW ultra-
supercritical coal-fired power station with a greenhouse intensity of 785-820 kg/MWh 
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(Owen 2007, p.3-15). Greenhouse gas emissions associated with this new power station 
would be 5.8 Mt CO2-e in 2016-17, assuming the lower range greenhouse intensity.  
Therefore, the Owen Inquiry scenario delivers an increase in greenhouse gas emissions of 
11.5 Mt CO2-e by 2016-17. This is a 14% increase in emissions from NSW electricity 
generation, making it very difficult for NSW to meet its target of stabilising greenhouse gas 
emissions at 2000 levels by 2025 (NSW Greenhouse Office 2005) and for Australia to meet its 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 
4.7.2 Revised Owen assumptions 
Under the Revised Owen scenario, growth in electricity demand is lower, with an increase of 
10,720 GWh per year by 2016-17. This means that the energy that needs to be supplied by 
new power stations falls to 5,350 GWh per year. Approximately 3,100 GWh per year of this 
energy would be met by new renewable energy investment under MRET that is not included 
in the TransGrid medium growth scenario. This leaves 2,250 GWh per year that would need 
to be supplied by a new a baseload CCGT power station, with a greenhouse intensity of 350 
kg/MWh. Greenhouse gas emissions from this power station would be 0.8 Mt CO2-e in 2016-
17. Therefore, total greenhouse gas emissions from the Revised Owen scenario would 
increase by 6.5 Mt CO2-e in 2016-17, an increase of 8% on 2007-08 emissions. 
4.7.3 Strong Climate Change Response assumptions 
Under the Strong Climate Change Response scenarios, electricity demand increases by 5,830 
GWh per year by 2016-17. All of this new demand is met by new investment in renewable 
energy generation under MRET. In fact, the new renewable energy investment is sufficient to 
displace 2,700 GWh per year of generation from the 85,100 GWh per year that existing plant 
can deliver. This means that there would be a small reduction in emissions under the Strong 
Climate Change Response scenarios – about 2.9 Mt CO2-e by 2016-17 (a 3% reduction in 
emissions). 
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5  Conclusion: A sustainabil i ty assessment 
5.1 Climate change response 
On the key question of climate change response, it is clear that the Owen Inquiry scenario 
and the Revised Owen scenario fail to deliver what is needed. Both would deliver substantial 
increases in emissions over the next ten years, at a time when we need to stabilise and reduce 
emissions. The two Strong Climate Change Response scenarios deliver a 3% reduction in 
emissions over the next ten years, which is consistent with the NSW Government’s target of 
stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at 2000 levels by 2025 (NSW Greenhouse Office 2005). 
5.1.1 Asking the right questions 
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the Owen Report is that it asks the wrong questions. In 
a time when urgent action is needed to avoid dangerous climate change, the Owen Report 
takes future electricity demand as given and asks how we can best continue to build fossil 
fuel power stations to supply that demand. This is old thinking. If we are to avoid dangerous 
climate change, we can no longer afford to increase energy demand at the rate we have in the 
past and we can no longer use greenhouse-intensive power stations to meet that demand. A 
coal-fired power station built now might continue to emit greenhouse gases for 40 or 50 
years. While there is a possibility that it could be retrofitted with carbon capture and storage 
technology, it is far from certain that this technology will ever be commercially feasible, 
particularly in comparison to other available options. In a carbon-constrained world, we can 
no longer afford ‘business as usual’ thinking. This is particularly the case now that Australia 
has committed to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The right questions for the NSW Government to ask about the NSW electricity industry are: 
• What level of greenhouse gas reduction is required in the NSW electricity industry to 
contribute to avoiding dangerous climate change? 
• What are the most cost-effective technological and institutional measures for 
achieving this target in the NSW electricity industry, while maintaining a reliable 
supply? 
• How can these measures be rapidly deployed to achieve the target? 
The cost of climate change will dwarf any of the costs considered in the Owen Report and it 
is on this much bigger issue that the NSW Government should be focusing its attention. 
5.1.2 Low emission baseload 
The Owen Report contends that the only viable technologies to deliver baseload power in the 
necessary timeframe are coal or gas-fired generation. Construction of a coal-fired power 
station that is not fitted with carbon capture and storage to greatly reduce its emissions is 
inconsistent with the urgency of climate change response and should not be supported by 
the NSW Government. If additional baseload capacity is needed by 2013-14, then 
construction of a combined cycle gas power station, with less than half the emissions of coal, 
is a preferable option. 
The Strong Climate Change Response scenarios demonstrate that future demand can be met 
through a combination of new energy efficiency measures and new renewable energy, 
consistent with the requirements of an expanded MRET of 20% by 2020. This raises the 
prospect that NSW could leap to low-emission baseload power to meet future needs without 
building any additional high-emission power stations. A combination of renewable energy 
sources that are currently viable, particularly wind power and biomass, could provide a 
viable substitute for baseload now. Further support for these technologies, and other small-
scale generation technologies, could be provided via a feed-in tariff. Feed-in tariffs have been 
used successfully in Europe to stimulate the development of renewable energy (World 
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Future Council 2007). Under a feed-in tariff, grid operators are obliged to give grid access to 
renewable energy and to purchase the electricity at premium prices. 
Other Australian States are moving ahead with feed-in tariffs. In South Australia, the 
Electricity (Feed in Scheme—Residential Solar Systems) Amendment Bill 2007 allows domestic 
customers who operate a small-scale grid-connected photovoltaic electricity system to 
receive 44 cents per kilowatt-hour of electricity fed back into the grid - twice the standard 
retail price (Government of South Australia 2007). In addition, the Queensland Government 
(2007) has committed to introduce a feed-in tariff for solar power and the ACT Government 
(2007) has committed to introduce a feed-in tariff for renewable micro-generation. The NSW 
Government has not announced any plans to consider or implement feed-in tariffs; this 
option should be explored as a high priority, given its success in driving renewable energy 
internationally. 
In the longer term, technologies that could become viable over the coming years include: 
• Geothermal hot rocks – the Geodynamics submission to the Inquiry indicated that it 
expects to deliver 500MW of baseload capacity to the NEM by 2014-2016. In addition: 
‘Phased development of the hot fractured rock resource beyond this time will see the 
geothermal industry able to provide some 4,000 MW of capacity for the NEM over 
the next 15 years to 2030’ (Williams 2007). 
• Large-scale solar thermal power – as noted in Section 3.3, the company established by 
Australia’s Dr David Mills (Ausra) has signed an agreement with several American 
utilities to deliver at least 1,500MW of solar thermal power in the United States over 
the next five to seven years (Ehrlich 2007). If this technology is not already viable, its 
viability should improve during this five to seven year period. 
• Carbon capture and storage – CCS technology is the subject of a great deal of 
research, development and commercialisation funding and may become available 
from 2015 (IPCC 2007). 
The existence of these prospective low-emission technologies provides further incentive to 
strongly pursue energy efficiency to allow time for these technologies to become available. In 
addition, the NSW Government should provide specific support for each of these 
technologies to assist them to become available in time to meet any future baseload shortfall. 
If NSW is to meet its target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 60% by 2050, it needs to 
be developing and supporting low-emission baseload technologies now. 
5.2 Ownership and investment strategy 
This report has shown that sale of the State-owned generation and retail assets is not the only 
option available to fund further investment in the NSW electricity industry. Other options 
are available, with varying degrees of public and private sector investment. The scenarios 
presented in Section 4 indicate that privatisation could have a net benefit to the State’s 
finances but could equally have a net negative impact, depending on the sale price. 
Strong climate change response is possible under either public or private sector ownership 
but would have different characteristics. These are considered below. 
5.2.1 Private ownership 
The Strong Climate Change Response (private) scenario has the NSW Government pursuing 
strong climate change response in a regulatory role and not as the owner of generation and 
retail assets. An advantage of this scenario is that it achieves a definite separation of 
regulation and ownership in the generation and retail sector, removing some of the potential 
for regulatory conflict of interest. The NSW Government would potentially be able to pursue 
stronger regulation on greenhouse gas emissions without being concerned about the impact 
on its own assets. However, the NSW Government’s continued ownership of transmission 
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and distribution businesses would continue to create a conflict due to the link between profit 
and energy transmitted. Nevertheless, private investment in energy efficiency and renewable 
energy could proceed with a degree of certainty, knowing that the NSW Government would 
not use its assets to intervene in the electricity market. 
However, this scenario has some important disadvantages. During the sale process, 
purchasers may seek concessions that will insulate them from the commercial risk associated 
with future greenhouse gas regulation. Current uncertainty over greenhouse gas regulation 
may also put downward pressure on the price paid for the assets. Further, once the 
generators are in private hands, the new owners will have every incentive to ensure that they 
keep operating for as long as possible with minimal emission reduction requirements. The 
NSW Government would need to resist the temptation to provide concessions to increase the 
sale price and would need to establish a clear timetable for greenhouse gas reduction, in 
collaboration with the Australian Government. This likely means holding off on any sale 
process until late 2008 while the structure of a future emissions trading scheme becomes 
clear. 
5.2.2 Public ownership 
The Strong Climate Change Response (public) scenario sees the NSW Government retain its 
ownership of the generators and retailers and use this ownership to take strong direct action 
to respond to climate change. It could act to transform its retailers into energy service 
companies (ESCOs) focused on delivery of energy services with the lowest greenhouse 
intensity. It could act quickly to either reduce the greenhouse intensity of its coal-fired power 
stations or establish a timetable for their retirement. This ability to act urgently and directly 
is an important advantage of this scenario. 
5.2.3 Recommended approach 
A recommended approach is outlined below, with several variations. 
The NSW Government should retain the State-owned generation and retail assets and invest 
as necessary to maintain the viability of these assets and reduce their environmental impact. 
This will definitely require some investment in the retail businesses to transform their 
business models; this is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.4. The NSW Government 
should also invest strongly in energy efficiency and low-emission baseload technologies, and 
may also need to invest in carbon-reduction technologies at existing coal-fired power 
stations in the future. 
We do not accept the Owen Report’s assertion that this approach would lead to the public 
sector funding all future investment in the NSW electricity industry. The private sector has 
already shown its willingness to invest in the NSW electricity industry under the current 
arrangements, through the Tallawarra and Uranquinty gas-fired power stations and the 
proposed Silverton Wind Farm. Additional private sector certainty should be provided 
through a clear policy statement from the NSW Government on the conditions that would 
cause it to intervene to ensure supply security. The NSW Government could also choose to 
offer suitable sites for sale to interests that wish to develop low-emission baseload power, 
while retaining existing generation assets. 
The impact of this strategy on State finances would be far less serious than indicated by the 
Owen Report. Even with strong investment in energy efficiency and low-emission 
technologies, the scale of investment will be much less than the $12 to $15 billion indicated 
by the Owen Report. An investment in the order of $6-8 billion is more likely. Further, this 
investment will earn a rate of return, delivered through ongoing dividends to the NSW 
Government and profit accrued by the State-owned businesses. This revenue could, and 
should, be used to invest in the transformation to a low-carbon electricity sector. The State’s 
credit rating is unlikely to be threatened by additional debt that will earn a reasonable rate of 
return. Further, as discussed in Section 3.5.1, the financial impact of a downgraded credit 
rating would be minimal if it was to occur. 
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Ultimately, electricity consumers will fund any investment in the NSW electricity industry, 
whether public or private, through their electricity bills. Public retention of existing assets 
and strong investment in energy efficiency offers the strongest potential to keep electricity 
bills down. 
5.2.4 Energy service companies 
One of the key arguments in the Owen Report is that the State-owned retailers are operating 
an outdated business model that reduces their viability in competition with vertically 
integrated competitors. The solution put forward by the Owen Report is to sell the retailers 
so that they can be incorporated into vertically integrated entities. Another way to transform 
the business model employed by the retailers is to transform them into energy service 
companies (ESCOs). 
ESCOs  assist end-users to meet their energy service requirements at minimum economic 
and environmental cost through appropriate use of distributed resources’ (Outhred and 
MacGill 2006, p.2). An energy service is a need that is met using energy, such as lighting, 
heating or cooling. End users do not care how much or what kind of energy is used to 
provide this service, as long as the service is provided. The most cost-effective way to deliver 
an energy service may not be through centralised provision of electricity – it may be cheaper 
to install efficient equipment and deliver less electricity or install distributed generation. 
ESCOs work with customers to deliver energy services in the most appropriate way. 
For existing retailers to successfully transition into ESCOs, they will need to be able to 
capture all of the value of their services. This means: 
• Being paid by end-users for the energy services they provide 
• Being able to sell greenhouse gas reductions through an emissions trading market 
• Being paid by network owners for reducing peak demand and reducing network 
augmentation costs. 
At the end user interface, ESCOs can provide financing options through electricity bills to 
cover the cost of energy efficiency installations. For example, an ESCO might install a solar 
water heater to replace an electric storage water heater and recover the capital cost through 
the savings on the electricity bill. The customer would see no difference in their bill until the 
capital cost was paid off but would not be exposed to the capital cost. 
The ESCO would then need to be able to sell any greenhouse gas reductions through an 
emissions trading market as an additional revenue stream. This is already possible in NSW 
through GGAS and several ESCOs have emerged in response to GGAS, such as Easy Being 
Green. However, as noted by the Owen Report, a national emissions trading scheme is 
unlikely to include demand-side abatement measures to avoid double counting (Owen 2007, 
p.4-25). The NSW Government should promote specific measures to ensure that ESCOs are 
compensated for demand-side abatement, either through compulsory payments from liable 
parties or a separate energy efficiency trading mechanism (as proposed in the Owen Report). 
The NSW D-Factor, introduced in IPART’s 2004 review of NSW electricity distribution 
pricing, provides a mechanism by which distribution network service providers (DNSPs) can 
recover demand management implementation costs and revenue foregone as a result of 
demand management activities (IPART 2004). The D-Factor is a component of the weighted 
average price cap for DNSPs that allows recovery of: 
• approved non-tariff-based demand management implementation costs, up to a 
maximum value equivalent to the expected avoided distribution costs 
• approved tariff-based demand management implementation costs 
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• approved revenue foregone as a result of non-tariff-based demand management 
activities (IPART 2004). 
Under the D-Factor rules, demand management activities can be undertaken on behalf of the 
DNSP, which means that an ESCO could reach an agreement to be paid by a DNSP for the 
network benefit associated with its demand management activities. However, future 
regulation of the NSW electricity distribution networks will be the responsibility of the 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER). It is far from clear whether the AER will retain the D-
Factor or any other incentives for demand management. The NSW Government should 
actively work with the AER to ensure that appropriate arrangement are in place to provide 
incentives for demand management and to ensure that ESCOs can be paid for network 
benefits associated with demand management they undertake. 
5.3 Consumer impact 
The four scenarios considered in Section 4 have quite different impacts on consumers. As 
argued in Section 3.5.2, the cost of energy service provision is higher under private 
ownership due to the higher cost of capital investment. This additional cost will inevitably 
be passed on to consumers. If the sale of generation and retail assets in NSW entrenches the 
growing dominance of AGL and Origin Energy in the NEM, then there will also be potential 
for the type of market concentration and upward price pressure that has occurred in the UK.  
In addition to these short-term consumer impacts, there will be long-term consumer impacts 
under any scenario that does not respond urgently to climate change. These impacts are of 
two kinds. First, there are the negative impacts of climate change on the NSW economy. 
Stern (2006) estimated the social cost of carbon at US$85/tonne, which means that every 
tonne of greenhouse gas emitted now adds US$85 to the eventual cost of climate change. 
Eventually, all consumers will pay this cost. The higher emissions under the Owen Inquiry 
and Revised Owen scenarios contribute to a higher cost of climate change in the future. 
Second, as demonstrated by Stern (2006), the cost of responding to climate change increases 
over time. Delayed response is more costly than responding now. The Owen Inquiry and 
Revised Owen scenarios delay serious climate change response and therefore incur greater 
eventual costs to consumers.  
The only scenario that avoids the higher cost of private ownership and the higher cost of 
delayed climate change response is the Strong Climate Change Response (public) scenario. 
This scenario has clear benefits for consumers. 
Regardless of whether the NSW electricity industry remains in public ownership or is sold to 
the private sector, there will be a need for improved customer protection measures to ensure 
that all customers continue to have affordable access to the essential service of electricity. 
Climate change response will inevitably put upward pressure on electricity prices over 
coming years. This is appropriate, as the price we pay for energy does not currently reflect 
its environmental cost. However, without appropriate customer protection measures, higher 
prices will increase the financial stress on low-income and disadvantaged households.  
5.4 Concluding remarks 
The scenario that strikes the best balance between environmental protection, economic well-
being and consumer impacts is the Strong Climate Change Response (public) scenario. This 
scenario demonstrates that it is possible to achieve a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
over the next 10 years without the need for privatisation and without putting supply 
reliability at risk. The NSW Government should put its efforts into realising this scenario, 
rather than investing time and resources in an unnecessary and potentially 
counterproductive push for privatisation. 
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